From msuinfo!uwm.edu!vixen.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!news.umbc.edu!olson Fri Dec 10 23:06:12 1993
Path: msuinfo!uwm.edu!vixen.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!news.umbc.edu!olson
From: olson@umbc.edu (Bryan G. Olson)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: A Quick IDEA, was: Speed of DES/IDEA implementations
Date: 7 Dec 1993 21:49:41 -0500
Organization: University of Maryland, Baltimore County Campus
Lines: 302
Sender: olson@umbc.edu (Bryan G. Olson; CMSC (G))
Distribution: world
Message-ID: <2e3fc5INNgg@umbc7.umbc.edu>
References: <2dvsed$7ob@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>
NNTP-Posting-Host: umbc7.umbc.edu
Keywords: IDEA, 386


In article <2dvsed$7ob@senator-bedfellow.MIT.EDU>, ninassup@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nikos I Nassuphis) writes:
|> I recently looked into the performance of DES/IDEA implementations
|> on Intel architectures.
|> 
[...]
|> I have been able to verify most numbers, and also checked some very good 
|> public-domain implementations available on wimsey.bc.ca
|> and ripem.msu.edu. Mr. Olson's performace figures, especialy the
|> IDEA implementation, is by far the best I heard of. Unfortunately
|> the code does not seem to be available.
|>
Sorry about that.  It's been a busy semester.

A while ago I posted a message claiming a speed of 238,000
bytes/sec for an implementation of IDEA on a 33Mh 486.  Below is
an explanation and some code to show how it works.  The basic
trick should be useful on many (but not all) processors.  I
expect only those familiar with IDEA and its reference
implementation will be able to follow the discussion.  See:

Lai, Xueja and Massey, James L.  A Proposal for a New Block
Encryption Standard, Eurocrypt 90

For those who have been asking for the code, sorry I kept
putting it off.  I wanted to get it out of Turbo Pascal
ideal-mode, but I never had the time.

Colin Plum wrote IDEA-386 code which is included in PGP
2.3a and uses the same tricks.  I don't know who's is
faster, but I expect they will be very close.  Now
here's how it's done.

A major bottleneck in software IDEA is the mul() routine, which
is used 34 times per 64 bit block.  The routine performs
multiplication in the multiplicative group mod 2^16+1.  The two
factors are each in a 16 bit word, and the output is also in a 16
bit word.  Note that 0 is not a member of the multiplicative
group and 2^16 does not fit in 16 bits. We therefor use the 0
word to represent 2^16.  Now group elements map one to one onto
all possible 16 bit words, since 2^16+1 is prime.

Here is (essentially) the reference implementation from [Lai].


unsigned mul( unsigned a, unsigned b ) {
  long int p ;
  long unsigned q ;
    if( a==0 ) p= 0x00010001 - b ;
    else if( b==0 ) p= 0x00010001 - a ;
    else {
        q= a*b;
        p= (q & 0xffff) - (q>>16)
        if( p<0 ) p= p + 0x00010001 ;
      }
    return (unsigned)(p & 0xffff) ;
}


Note the method of reducing a 32 bit word modulo 2^16-1.  We
subtract the high word from the low word, and add the modulus
back if the result is less than 0.  [Lai] contains a proof that
this works, and you can convince yourself fairly easily.

To speed up this routine, we note that the tests for a=0 and b=0
will rarely be false.  With the possible exception of the first 2
of the 34 multiplications, 0 should be no more likely than any of
the other 65535 numbers.  Note that if (and only if) either a or
b is 0 then q will also be 0, and we can check for this in one
instruction if our processor sets a zero flag for multiplication
(as the 68000 does but 80x86 does not).  

Fortunately p will also be zero after the subtraction if and only
if either a or b is 0.  Proof: r will be zero when the high order
word of q equals the low order word, and that happens when q is
divisible by 00010001 hex.  Since 00010001h = 2^16+1 is prime,
this happens if either a or b is a multiple of 2^16+1, and 0 is
the only such multiple which will fit in a 16 bit word.

The speed-up strategy is to proceed under the assumption that a
and b are not 0, check to be sure in one instruction, and
recompute if the assumption was wrong.  Here's some 8086
assembler code:

    mov  ax, [a]
    mul  [b]        ; ax is implied. q is now in DX AX
    sub  ax, dx     ; mod 2^16+1 
    jnz  not0       ; Jump if neither op was 0. Usually taken.

    mov  ax, 1      ; recompute result knowing one op is 0.
    sub  ax, [a]
    sub  ax, [b]
    jmp  out        ; Just jump over adding the carry.
not0:
    adc  ax, 0      ; If r<0 add 1, otherwise do nothing.
out:                ; Result is now in ax


Note that when r<0 we add 1 instead of 2^16+1 since the 2^16 part
overflows out of the result.  The "adc  ax, 0" does all the work
of checking for a negative result and adding the modulus if
needed.

The multiplication takes 9 instructions, 4 of which are rarely
executed.  I believe similar tricks are possible on many
processors.  The one drawback to the check-after-multiply tactic
is that we can't let the multiply overwrite the only copy of an
operand.

Note that most software implementations of IDEA will run at
slightly different speeds when 0's come up in the multiply
routine.  The reference implementation is faster on 0, this one
is faster on non-zero.  This may be a problem for some real-time
stuff, and also suggests an attack based on timing.

Finally, below is an implementation of the complete encryption
function in 8086 assembler, to replace the cipher_idea() function
in PGP.  It takes the same parameters as the function from PGP,
and uses the c language calling conventions.  I tested it using
the debug features of the idea.c file in PGP.  You will need to
add segment/assume directives.  This version uses no global data
and should be reentrant.

The handling of zero multipliers is outside the inner loop so
that a short conditional jump can loop back to the beginning. 
Forward conditional jumps are usually not taken and backward
jumps are usually taken, which is consistent with 586 branch
prediction (or so I've heard).  Stalls where the output of one
instruction is needed for the next seem unavoidable.

Last I heard, IDEA was patent pending.  My code is up for grabs,
although I would get a kick out being credited if you use it.
On the other hand Colin's code is already tested and ready
to assemble and link with PGP.

--Bryan

____________________CODE STARTS BELOW THIS LINE_________

;  Called as: asmcrypt( inbuff, outbuff, zkey ) just like PGP

PROC    _asmcrypt

        ; establish parameter and local space on stack
        ; follow c language calling conventions

        ARG  inblock:Word, outblock:Word, zkey:Word
        LOCAL sx1:Word,sx4:Word,skk:Word,done8:Word =stacksize

        push bp
        mov  bp, sp
        sub  sp, stacksize

 ;      push ax     ; My compiler assumes these are not saved.
 ;      push bx
 ;      push cx
 ;      push dx

        push si
        push di

; Put the 16 bit sub-blocks in registers and/or local variables
        mov  si, [inblock]
        mov  ax, [si]
        mov  [sx1], ax       ; x1  is in ax and sx1
        mov  di, [si+2]      ; x2  is in di
        mov  bx, [si+4]      ; x3  is in bx
        mov  dx, [si+6]
        mov  [sx4], dx       ; x4  is in sx4

        mov  si, [zkey]      ; si points to next subkey
        mov  [done8], si
        add  [done8], 96     ; we will be finished with 8 rounds
                             ; when si=done8

@@loop:                      ; 8 rounds of this
        add  di, [si+2]      ; x2+=zkey[2]  is in di
        add  bx, [si+4]      ; x3+=zkey[4]  is in bx

        mul  [Word si]       ;x1 *= zkey[0]
        sub  ax, dx
        jz  @@x1             ; if 0, use special case multiply
        adc  ax, 0
@@x1out:
        mov  [sx1], ax       ; x1 is in ax and sx1

        xor  ax, bx          ; ax= x1^x3
        mul  [Word si+8]     ; compute kk
        sub  ax, dx          ; if 0, use special case multiply
        jz  @@kk
        adc  ax, 0
@@kkout:
        mov  cx, ax          ; kk is in cx

        mov  ax, [sx4]       ; x4 *= zkey[6]
        mul  [Word si+6]
        sub  ax, dx
        jz   @@x4            ; if 0, use special case multiply
        adc  ax, 0
@@x4out:
        mov  [sx4], ax       ; x4 is in sx4 and ax

        xor  ax, di          ; x4^x2
        add  ax, cx          ; kk+(x2^x4)
        mul  [Word si+10]    ; compute t1
        sub  ax, dx
        jz  @@t1             ; if 0, use special case multiply
        adc  ax, 0
@@t1out:                     ; t1 is in ax

        add  cx, ax          ; t2 is in cx   kk+t1

        xor  [sx4], cx       ; x4 in sx4
        xor  di, cx          ; new x3 in di
        xor  bx, ax          ; new x2 in bx
        xchg bx, di          ; x2 in di, x3 in bx
        xor  ax, [sx1]       ; x1 in ax
        mov  [sx1], ax       ; and [sx1]

        add  si, 12          ; point to next subkey
        cmp  si, [done8]
        jne  @@loop
        jmp  @@out8

;------------------------------------------
; Special case multiplications, when one factor is 0

@@x1:   mov  ax, 1
        sub  ax, [sx1]
        sub  ax, [Word si]
        jmp  @@x1out

@@kk:   mov  ax, [sx1]       ; rebuild overwritten operand
        xor  ax, bx
        neg  ax
        inc  ax
        sub  ax, [si+8]
        jmp  @@kkout

@@x4:   mov  ax, 1
        sub  ax, [sx4]
        sub  ax, [Word si+6]
        jmp  @@x4out

@@t1:   mov  ax, [sx4]       ; rebuild
        xor  ax, di
        add  ax, cx
        neg  ax
        inc  ax
        sub  ax, [si+10]
        jmp  @@t1out

;---------------------------------------------------
;   8 rounds are done, now that extra pseudo-round

@@out8:
        push di
        mov  di, [outblock]

        mul  [Word si]
        sub  ax, dx
        jnz  @@o1n           ; jump over special case code
        mov  ax, 1
        sub  ax, [sx1]
        sub  ax, [si]
        jmp  @@o1out
@@o1n:  adc  ax, 0
@@o1out:  mov [di], ax       ; final ciphertext block 1

        mov  ax, [sx4]
        mul  [Word si+6]
        sub  ax, dx
        jnz  @@o4n           ; jump over special case code
        mov  ax, 1
        sub  ax, [sx4]
        sub  ax, [si+6]
        jmp  @@o4out
@@o4n:  adc  ax, 0
@@o4out: mov  [di+6], ax     ; final ciphertext block 4

        add  bx, [si+2]
        mov  [di+2], bx      ; final ciphertext block 2
        pop  ax
        add  ax, [si+4]
        mov  [di+4], ax      ; final ciphertext block 3

;  Restore the stack and return

        pop  di
        pop  si
;       pop  dx
;       pop  cx
;       pop  bx
;       pop  ax

        mov  sp, bp
        pop  bp
        ret
ENDP    _asmcrypt




