<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-13" number="9802" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" xml:lang="en" updates="" obsoletes="" prepTime="2025-06-26T16:11:40" indexInclude="true" scripts="Common,Latin" tocDepth="3">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-shbs-13" rel="prev"/>
  <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9802" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="HSS and XMSS for X.509">Use of the HSS and XMSS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9802" stream="IETF"/>
    <author initials="D." surname="Van Geest" fullname="Daniel Van Geest">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">CryptoNext Security</organization>
      <address>
        <email>daniel.vangeest@cryptonext-security.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="K." surname="Bashiri" fullname="Kaveh Bashiri">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kaveh.bashiri.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Fluhrer" fullname="Scott Fluhrer">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Cisco Systems</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sfluhrer@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Gazdag" fullname="Stefan-Lukas Gazdag">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">genua GmbH</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ietf@gazdag.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Kousidis" fullname="Stavros Kousidis">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kousidis.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="06" year="2025"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>lamps</workgroup>
    <keyword>HSS</keyword>
    <keyword>LMS</keyword>
    <keyword>XMSS</keyword>
    <keyword>certificate</keyword>
    <keyword>X.509</keyword>
    <keyword>PKIX</keyword>
    <keyword>stateful</keyword>
    <keyword>hash-based</keyword>
    <abstract pn="section-abstract">
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
      formats for the following stateful Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes:
      Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
      (XMSS), and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> (a multi-tree variant of XMSS).  This specification
      applies to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) when
      digital signatures are used to sign certificates and certificate
      revocation lists (CRLs).</t>
    </abstract>
    <boilerplate>
      <section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9802" brackets="none"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
        </t>
      </section>
    </boilerplate>
    <toc>
      <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
        <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1">
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">Introduction</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-conventions-and-definitions">Conventions and Definitions</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-use-cases-of-stateful-hbs-s">Use Cases of Stateful HBS Schemes in X.509</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-algorithm-identifiers-and-p">Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="4.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-hss-algorithm-identifier">HSS Algorithm Identifier</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="4.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-algorithm-identifier">XMSS Algorithm Identifier</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="4.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-mt-algorithm-identifie">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Algorithm Identifier</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-public-key-identifiers">Public Key Identifiers</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-hss-public-keys">HSS Public Keys</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-public-keys">XMSS Public Keys</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="5.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-mt-public-keys">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Public Keys</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-key-usage-bits">Key Usage Bits</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-signature-algorithms">Signature Algorithms</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="7.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-hss-signature-algorithm">HSS Signature Algorithm</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="7.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-signature-algorithm">XMSS Signature Algorithm</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1"><xref derivedContent="7.3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7.3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-mt-signature-algorithm">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Signature Algorithm</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-key-generation">Key Generation</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><xref derivedContent="9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-asn1-module">ASN.1 Module</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><xref derivedContent="10" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><xref derivedContent="11" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-backup-and-restore-manageme">Backup and Restore Management</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.12">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><xref derivedContent="12" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-12"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><xref derivedContent="13" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="13.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="13.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-13.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-references">Informative References</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix A" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-hss-x509-v3-certificate-exa">HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.15">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.15.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix B" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-x509-v3-certificate-ex">XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.16">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.16.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix C" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.c"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-xmss-mt-x509-v3-certificate">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> X.509 v3 Certificate Example</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.17">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.17.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.d"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgments">Acknowledgments</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.18">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.18.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.e"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</xref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </toc>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1">
      <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">Stateful Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes such as the Hierarchical
      Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and
      XMSS<sup>MT</sup> combine Merkle trees with One-Time Signatures (OTS). This is
      done in order to provide digital signature schemes that remain secure
      even when quantum computers become available. Their theoretic security
      is well understood and depends only on the security of the underlying
      hash function. As such, they can serve as an important building block for
      quantum computer resistant information and communication technology.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-2">A stateful HBS private key consists of a finite collection of OTS
      keys, along with state information that tracks the usage of these keys
      to ensure the security of the scheme. Only a limited number of messages
      can be signed, and the private key's state must be updated and persisted
      after signing to prevent reuse of OTS keys.  While the right selection
      of algorithm parameters would allow a private key to sign a virtually
      unbounded number of messages (e.g., 2<sup>60</sup>), this is at the cost
      of a larger signature size and longer signing time. Because the private
      key in stateful HBS schemes is stateful and the number of signatures
      that can be generated is limited, these schemes may be unsuitable for
      use in interactive protocols. However, in some use cases, the deployment
      of stateful HBS schemes may be appropriate. Such use cases are described
      and discussed in <xref target="use-cases-shbs-x509" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-2">
      <name slugifiedName="name-conventions-and-definitions">Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">
    The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be
    interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
    shown here.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="use-cases-shbs-x509" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-3">
      <name slugifiedName="name-use-cases-of-stateful-hbs-s">Use Cases of Stateful HBS Schemes in X.509</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">As described in the Security Considerations in <xref target="sec-security" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 10"/>, it is imperative that stateful HBS
      implementations do not reuse OTS signatures. This makes stateful HBS
      algorithms inappropriate for general use cases. The exact conditions
      under which stateful HBS certificates may be used is left to certificate
      policies <xref target="RFC3647" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3647"/>.  However, the intended use of stateful
      HBS schemes as described by <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> can be used as a
      guideline:</t>
      <blockquote pn="section-3-2">
	stateful HBS schemes are primarily intended for applications
	with the following characteristics: 1) it is necessary to implement a
	digital signature scheme in the near future; 2) the implementation
	will have a long lifetime; and 3) it would not be practical to
	transition to a different digital signature scheme once the
	implementation has been deployed.
      </blockquote>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-3">In addition, since a stateful HBS private key can only generate a
      finite number of signatures, use cases for stateful HBS public keys in
      certificates should have a predictable range of the number of signatures
      that will be generated, falling safely below the maximum number of
      signatures that a private key can generate.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-4">Use cases where stateful HBS public keys in certificates may be
      appropriate due to the relatively small number of signatures generated
      and the signer's ability to enforce security restrictions on the signing
      environment include:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-3-5">
        <li pn="section-3-5.1">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-3-5.1.1">Firmware signing (see Section 1.1 of <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/>,
          <xref target="CNSA2.0" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="CNSA2.0"/>, and Section 6.7 of <xref target="BSI" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="BSI"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li pn="section-3-5.2">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-3-5.2.1">Software signing (<xref target="CNSA2.0" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="CNSA2.0"/> and <xref target="ANSSI" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="ANSSI"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li pn="section-3-5.3">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-3-5.3.1">Certification Authority (CA) certificates</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-6">In each of these cases, the operator tightly controls their secured
      signing environment and can mitigate OTS key reuse by employing state
      management strategies such as those in <xref target="sec-security" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 10"/>. Also, for secure private key backup and
      restoration, adequate mechanisms have to be implemented (see <xref target="backup-restore" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 11"/>).</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-7">Generally speaking, stateful HBS public keys are not appropriate for
      use in end-entity certificates, however, in the firmware and software
      signing cases, signature generation will often be more tightly
      controlled. Some manufactures use common and well-established key
      formats like X.509 for their code signing and update mechanisms. Also,
      there are multi-party Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems where publicly
      trusted code signing certificates are useful.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-8">In general, root CAs <xref target="RFC4949" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4949"/> generate signatures in
      a more secure environment and issue fewer certificates than subordinate
      CAs <xref target="RFC4949" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4949"/>. This makes the use of stateful HBS public
      keys more appropriate in root CA certificates than in subordinate CA
      certificates. However, if a subordinate CA can match the security and
      signature count restrictions of a root CA, for example, if the
      subordinate CA only issues code-signing certificates, then using a
      stateful HBS public key in the subordinate CA certificate may be
      practical.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="algorithm-identifiers-and-parameters" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4">
      <name slugifiedName="name-algorithm-identifiers-and-p">Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">In this document, we define new Object Identifiers (OIDs) for
      identifying the different stateful hash-based signature algorithms. An
      additional OID is defined in <xref target="RFC9708" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9708"/> and repeated here
      for convenience.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-2">The AlgorithmIdentifier type is defined in <xref target="RFC5912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> as follows:</t>
      <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-4-3">
AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM-TYPE, ALGORITHM-TYPE:AlgorithmSet} ::=
        SEQUENCE {
            algorithm   ALGORITHM-TYPE.&amp;id({AlgorithmSet}),
            parameters  ALGORITHM-TYPE.
                   &amp;Params({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL
        }
</sourcecode>
      <aside pn="section-4-4">
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4-4.1">NOTE: The above syntax is from <xref target="RFC5912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> and is
        compatible with the 2021 ASN.1 syntax <xref target="X680" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X680"/>.  See
        <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> for the 1988 ASN.1 syntax.</t>
      </aside>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-5">The fields in AlgorithmIdentifier have the following meanings:</t>
      <dl spacing="normal" indent="3" newline="false" pn="section-4-6">
        <dt pn="section-4-6.1">algorithm:</dt>
        <dd pn="section-4-6.2">this identifies the cryptographic algorithm with an OID.</dd>
        <dt pn="section-4-6.3">parameters:</dt>
        <dd pn="section-4-6.4">these are optional and are the associated parameters for
          the algorithm identifier in the algorithm field.</dd>
      </dl>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-7">The parameters field of the AlgorithmIdentifier for HSS, XMSS, and
      XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public keys <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be absent.</t>
      <section anchor="hss-algorithm-identifier" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-hss-algorithm-identifier">HSS Algorithm Identifier</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-1">The OID and public key algorithm identifier for HSS
        is defined in <xref target="RFC9708" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9708"/>. The definitions are repeated
        here for reference.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-2">The AlgorithmIdentifier for an HSS public key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        use the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OID.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-4.1-3">
   id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
      smime(16) alg(3) 17 }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-4">Note that the id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig algorithm identifier is also
        referred to as id-alg-mts-hashsig. This synonym is based on the
        terminology used in an early draft of the document that became <xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/>.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.1-5">The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
        the height used in the HSS tree. <xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/> and <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> define these values, and additional identifiers can be registered in the "Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)" registry <xref target="IANA-LMS" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IANA-LMS"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmss-algorithm-identifier" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-algorithm-identifier">XMSS Algorithm Identifier</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.2-1">The AlgorithmIdentifier for an XMSS public key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        use the id-alg-xmss-hashsig OID.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-4.2-2">
   id-alg-xmss-hashsig  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 34 }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.2-3">The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
        the height used in the XMSS tree. <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> and <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> define these values, and additional identifiers can be registered in the "Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)" registry <xref target="IANA-XMSS" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IANA-XMSS"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmssmt-algorithm-identifier" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4.3">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-mt-algorithm-identifie">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Algorithm Identifier</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3-1">The AlgorithmIdentifier for an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OID.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-4.3-2">
   id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
      iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 35 }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-4.3-3">The public key and signature values identify the hash function and
        the height used in the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> tree. <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> and
        <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> define these values, and additional identifiers can be registered in the "Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)" registry
        <xref target="IANA-XMSS" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="IANA-XMSS"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="public-key-identifiers" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-5">
      <name slugifiedName="name-public-key-identifiers">Public Key Identifiers</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-1">Certificates conforming to <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> can convey a
      public key for any public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the
      algorithm through an algorithm identifier. An algorithm identifier
      consists of an OID and optional parameters.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-2"><xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/> defines the encoding of HSS public keys, and
      <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> defines the encodings of XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup>
      public keys.  When used in a SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, the
      subjectPublicKey BIT STRING contains these encodings of the public
      key.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-3">This document defines ASN.1 <xref target="X680" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X680"/> OCTET STRING types
      for encoding the public keys when not used in a
      SubjectPublicKeyInfo. The OCTET STRING is mapped to a subjectPublicKey
      (a value of type BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the
      OCTET STRING value becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING
      value, and so on; the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes
      the least significant bit of the BIT STRING.</t>
      <section anchor="hss-public-keys" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-5.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-hss-public-keys">HSS Public Keys</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1-1">The HSS public key identifier is as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.1-2">
   pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig
      -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
      PARAMS ARE absent
      CERT-KEY-USAGE
         { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1-3">The HSS public key is defined as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.1-4">
   HSS-LMS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.1-5">
	  <xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/> defines the encoding of an HSS public key
	  using the <tt>hss_public_key</tt> structure. See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/> for more
	  information on the contents and format of an HSS public key. Note
	  that the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) single-tree signature
	  scheme is instantiated as HSS with the number of levels being equal
	  to 1.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmss-public-keys" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-5.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-public-keys">XMSS Public Keys</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.2-1">The XMSS public key identifier is as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.2-2">
   pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
      -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
      PARAMS ARE absent
      CERT-KEY-USAGE
         { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.2-3">The XMSS public key is defined as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.2-4">
   XMSS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.2-5"><xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> defines the encoding of an XMSS public key using the
<tt>xmss_public_key</tt> structure. See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> for more information
on the contents and format of an XMSS public key.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmssmt-public-keys" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-5.3">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-mt-public-keys">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Public Keys</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.3-1">The XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key identifier is as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.3-2">
   pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
      IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
      -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
      PARAMS ARE absent
      CERT-KEY-USAGE
         { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.3-3">The XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key is defined as follows:</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-5.3-4">
   XMSSMT-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-5.3-5"><xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> defines the encoding of an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key using the
<tt>xmssmt_public_key</tt> structure. See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> for more information
on the contents and format of an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="key-usage-bits" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-6">
      <name slugifiedName="name-key-usage-bits">Key Usage Bits</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-1">The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage
      certificate extension <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>.  When
      id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, id-alg-xmss-hashsig, or id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
      appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of a CA X.509 certificate
      <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>, the certificate key usage extension
      <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least one of the following values:
      digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, or cRLSign. However, it
      <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain other values.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-2">When id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, id-alg-xmss-hashsig, or
      id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig appears in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo field of an
      end entity X.509 certificate <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>, the certificate
      key usage extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain at least one of the
      following values: digitalSignature, nonRepudiation or cRLSign. However,
      it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain other values.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="signature-algorithms" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7">
      <name slugifiedName="name-signature-algorithms">Signature Algorithms</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-7-1">The same OIDs used to identify HSS, XMSS, and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public keys are
      also used to identify their respective signatures.  When these algorithm
      identifiers appear in the algorithm field of an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
      encoding <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> omit the parameters field. That is, the
      AlgorithmIdentifier <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be a SEQUENCE of one component,
      one of the OIDs defined in the following subsections.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-7-2">When the signature algorithm identifiers described in this document
      are used to create a signature on a message, no digest algorithm is
      applied to the message before signing.  That is, the full data to be
      signed is signed rather than a digest of the data.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-7-3">The format of an HSS signature is described in <xref section="6.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8554" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8554#section-6.2" derivedContent="RFC8554"/>. The format of an XMSS signature
      is described in <xref section="B.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8391" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8391#appendix-B.2" derivedContent="RFC8391"/>, and the format of an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature is described
      in <xref section="C.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8391" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8391#appendix-C.2" derivedContent="RFC8391"/>.  The octet
      string representing the signature is encoded directly in a BIT STRING
      without adding any additional ASN.1 wrapping. For the Certificate and
      CertificateList structures, the octet string is encoded in the
      "signatureValue" BIT STRING field.</t>
      <section anchor="hss-signature-algorithm" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-hss-signature-algorithm">HSS Signature Algorithm</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-1">The id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig OID is used to specify that an HSS
        signature was generated on the full message, i.e., the message was not
        hashed before being processed by the HSS signature algorithm.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.1-2">See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8554" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8554"/> for more
        information on the contents and format of an HSS signature.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmss-signature-algorithm" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-signature-algorithm">XMSS Signature Algorithm</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-1">The id-alg-xmss-hashsig OID is used to specify that an XMSS
        signature was generated on the full message, i.e., the message was not
        hashed before being processed by the XMSS signature algorithm.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-2">See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> for more
        information on the contents and format of an XMSS signature.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.2-3">The signature generation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be performed according
        to Section 7.2 of <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="xmssmt-signature-algorithm" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-7.3">
        <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-mt-signature-algorithm">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Signature Algorithm</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-1">The id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig OID is used to specify that an XMSS<sup>MT</sup>
        signature was generated on the full message, i.e., the message was not
        hashed before being processed by the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature algorithm.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-2">See <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="RFC8391" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8391"/> for more
        information on the contents and format of an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature.</t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-7.3-3">The signature generation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be performed according
        to Section 7.2 of <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="key-generation" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-8">
      <name slugifiedName="name-key-generation">Key Generation</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-8-1">The key generation for XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
      performed according to Section 7.2 of <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-asn1" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-9">
      <name slugifiedName="name-asn1-module">ASN.1 Module</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-1">For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax is presented as an ASN.1
      module here <xref target="X680" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X680"/>.  Note that as per <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>, certificates use the Distinguished Encoding Rules;
      see <xref target="X690" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="X690"/>.  This ASN.1 module builds upon the
      conventions established in <xref target="RFC5912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/>. This module imports
      objects from <xref target="RFC5912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> and <xref target="RFC9708" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9708"/>.</t>
      <sourcecode type="asn1" markers="false" pn="section-9-2">
X509-SHBS-2024
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024(114) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

EXPORTS ALL;

IMPORTS
  PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
    FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009  -- [RFC5912]
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }

  sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig, pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig
    FROM MTS-HashSig-2013 -- [RFC9708]
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
        id-smime(16) id-mod(0) id-mod-mts-hashsig-2013(64) };

--
-- Object Identifiers
--

-- id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig is defined in [RFC9708]

id-alg-xmss-hashsig  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 34 }

id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
   mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6) 35 }

--
-- Signature Algorithms and Public Keys
--

-- sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC9708]

sa-XMSS-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
   IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
   PARAMS ARE absent
   PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSS-HashSig }
   SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmss-hashsig } }

sa-XMSSMT-HashSig SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
   IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
   PARAMS ARE absent
   PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-XMSSMT-HashSig }
   SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig } }

-- pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig is defined in [RFC9708]

pk-XMSS-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
   IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmss-hashsig
   -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
   PARAMS ARE absent
   CERT-KEY-USAGE
      { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

XMSS-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING

pk-XMSSMT-HashSig PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
   IDENTIFIER id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig
   -- KEY no ASN.1 wrapping --
   PARAMS ARE absent
   CERT-KEY-USAGE
      { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign } }

XMSSMT-HashSig-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING

--
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
--
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
   -- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912
   pk-HSS-LMS-HashSig |
   pk-XMSS-HashSig |
   pk-XMSSMT-HashSig,
   ...
}

--
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
--
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
   -- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
   sa-HSS-LMS-HashSig |
   sa-XMSS-HashSig |
   sa-XMSSMT-HashSig,
   ...
}

END
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-security" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-10">
      <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-10-1">The security requirements of <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be taken into account.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-10-2">As stateful HBS private keys can only generate a limited number of
      signatures, a user needs to be aware of the total number of signatures
      they intend to generate in their use case; otherwise, they risk
      exhausting the number of OTS keys in their private key.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-10-3">For stateful HBS schemes, it is crucial to stress the importance of

      correct state management.  If an attacker were able to obtain signatures
      for two different messages created using the same OTS key, then it would
      become computationally feasible for that attacker to create forgeries
      <xref target="BH16" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="BH16"/>. As noted in <xref target="MCGREW" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="MCGREW"/> and <xref target="ETSI-TR-103-692" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="ETSI-TR-103-692"/>, extreme care needs to be taken in order to
      avoid the risk that an OTS key will be reused accidentally.  This is a
      new requirement that most developers will not be familiar with and
      requires careful handling.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-10-4">Various strategies for a correct state management can be applied:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-10-5">
        <li pn="section-10-5.1">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-10-5.1.1">Implement a record of all signatures generated by a key pair
          associated with a stateful HBS instance, for example, by logging the
          OTS key indexes as signatures are generated. This record may be
          stored outside the device that is used to generate the
          signature. Check the record to prevent OTS key reuse before a new
          signature is released. If OTS key reuse is detected, freeze all new
          signature generation by the private key, re-audit previously
          released signatures (possibly revoking the private key if previously
          released signatures showed OTS key reuse), and perform a
          post-failure audit.</t>
        </li>
        <li pn="section-10-5.2">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-10-5.2.1">Use a stateful HBS instance only for a moderate number of
          signatures such that it is always practical to keep a consistent
          record and be able to unambiguously trace back all generated
          signatures.</t>
        </li>
        <li pn="section-10-5.3">
          <t indent="0" pn="section-10-5.3.1">Apply the state reservation strategy described in Section 5 of
          <xref target="MCGREW" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="MCGREW"/>, where upcoming states are reserved in
          advance by the signer. In this way, the number of state
          synchronizations between nonvolatile and volatile memory is
          reduced.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="backup-restore" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-11">
      <name slugifiedName="name-backup-and-restore-manageme">Backup and Restore Management</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-11-1">Certificate authorities have high demands in order to ensure the
      availability of signature generation throughout the validity period of
      signing key pairs.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-11-2">Some usual backup and restore strategies when using a stateless signature
   scheme (e.g., SLH-DSA) are to:</t>
      <ul bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" spacing="normal" pn="section-11-3">
        <li pn="section-11-3.1">duplicate private keying material and operate redundant signing
     devices.</li>
        <li pn="section-11-3.2">store and safeguard a copy of the private keying material such that
     it can be used to set up a new signing device in case of technical
     difficulties.</li>
      </ul>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-11-4">For stateful HBS schemes, such straightforward backup and restore
      strategies will lead to OTS reuse with high probability as a correct
      state management is not guaranteed.  Strategies for maintaining
      availability and keeping a correct state are described in Section 7 of
      <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/> and <xref target="I-D.wiggers-hbs-state" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="S-HBS"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-12">
      <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-12-1">IANA has registered the following OID for the ASN.1 module (see <xref target="sec-asn1" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 9"/>) in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module
      Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry:</t>
      <table align="center" pn="table-1">
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Decimal</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">References</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">114</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-mod-pkix1-shbs-2024</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9802</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-12-3">IANA has registered the following entries in the "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms"
      (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry <xref target="SMI-PKIX" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SMI-PKIX"/>:</t>
      <table align="center" pn="table-2">
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Decimal</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">References</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">34</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-alg-xmss-hashsig</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9802</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">35</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-alg-xmssmt-hashsig</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9802</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <displayreference target="I-D.wiggers-hbs-state" to="S-HBS"/>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references" pn="section-13">
      <name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references" pn="section-13.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5912">
          <front>
            <title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8391" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8391" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8391">
          <front>
            <title>XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme</title>
            <author fullname="A. Huelsing" initials="A." surname="Huelsing"/>
            <author fullname="D. Butin" initials="D." surname="Butin"/>
            <author fullname="S. Gazdag" initials="S." surname="Gazdag"/>
            <author fullname="J. Rijneveld" initials="J." surname="Rijneveld"/>
            <author fullname="A. Mohaisen" initials="A." surname="Mohaisen"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hash-based digital signature system that is based on existing descriptions in scientific literature. This note specifies Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus (WOTS+), a one-time signature scheme; XMSS, a single-tree scheme; and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant of XMSS. Both XMSS and XMSS^MT use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems. Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is suitable for compact implementations, is relatively simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures can so far withstand known attacks using quantum computers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8391"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8391"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8554" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8554" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8554">
          <front>
            <title>Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="D. McGrew" initials="D." surname="McGrew"/>
            <author fullname="M. Curcio" initials="M." surname="Curcio"/>
            <author fullname="S. Fluhrer" initials="S." surname="Fluhrer"/>
            <date month="April" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This note describes a digital-signature system based on cryptographic hash functions, following the seminal work in this area of Lamport, Diffie, Winternitz, and Merkle, as adapted by Leighton and Micali in 1995. It specifies a one-time signature scheme and a general signature scheme. These systems provide asymmetric authentication without using large integer mathematics and can achieve a high security level. They are suitable for compact implementations, are relatively simple to implement, and are naturally resistant to side-channel attacks. Unlike many other signature systems, hash-based signatures would still be secure even if it proves feasible for an attacker to build a quantum computer.</t>
              <t indent="0">This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. This has been reviewed by many researchers, both in the research group and outside of it. The Acknowledgements section lists many of them.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8554"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8554"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9708" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9708" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9708">
          <front>
            <title>Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="January" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies the conventions for using the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). In addition, the algorithm identifier and public key syntax are provided. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital signature; it is described in RFC 8554. This document obsoletes RFC 8708.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9708"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9708"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SP800208" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="SP800208">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes</title>
            <author fullname="David A. Cooper" surname="Cooper" initials="D"/>
            <author fullname="Daniel C. Apon" surname="Apon" initials="D"/>
            <author fullname="Quynh H. Dang" surname="Dang" initials="Q"/>
            <author fullname="Michael S. Davidson" surname="Davidson" initials="M"/>
            <author fullname="Morris J. Dworkin" surname="Dworkin" initials="M"/>
            <author fullname="Carl A. Miller" surname="Miller" initials="C"/>
            <date year="2020" month="October" day="29"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-208"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.sp.800-208"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X680" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="X680">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2021"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X690" target="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="X690">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology: ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.690"/>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8825-1:2021"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references" pn="section-13.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="ANSSI" target="https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/follow_up_position_paper_on_post_quantum_cryptography.pdf" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="ANSSI">
          <front>
            <title>ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition (2023 follow up)</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI)">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="December" day="21"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BH16" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1042" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="BH16">
          <front>
            <title>Oops, I did it again - Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message Attacks.</title>
            <author initials="L." surname="Bruinderink">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Hülsing">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date year="2016"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/1042</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BSI" target="https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Brochure/quantum-safe-cryptography.pdf" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="BSI">
          <front>
            <title>Quantum-safe cryptography - fundamentals, current developments and recommendations</title>
            <author initials="" surname="Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="May" day="18"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CNSA2.0" target="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="CNSA2.0">
          <front>
            <title>The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">National Security Agency (NSA)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="September" day="07"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ETSI-TR-103-692" target="https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103600_103699/103692/01.01.01_60/tr_103692v010101p.pdf" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="ETSI-TR-103-692">
          <front>
            <title>CYBER; State management for stateful authentication mechanisms</title>
            <author initials="" surname="European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ETSI TR" value="103 692 v1.1.1"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA-LMS" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="IANA-LMS">
          <front>
            <title>Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA-XMSS" target="https://iana.org/assignments/xmss-extended-hash-based-signatures/" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="IANA-XMSS">
          <front>
            <title>XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MCGREW" target="https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/357" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="MCGREW">
          <front>
            <title>State Management for Hash-Based Signatures</title>
            <author initials="D." surname="McGrew">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="P." surname="Kampanakis">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Fluhrer">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Gazdag">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Butin">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Buchmann">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date year="2016" month="November" day="02"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/357</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3279" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3279">
          <front>
            <title>Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="L. Bassham" initials="L." surname="Bassham"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="April" year="2002"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for digital signatures and subject public keys used in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Digital signatures are used to sign certificates and certificate revocation list (CRLs). Certificates include the public key of the named subject. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3279"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3279"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3647" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3647">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework</title>
            <author fullname="S. Chokhani" initials="S." surname="Chokhani"/>
            <author fullname="W. Ford" initials="W." surname="Ford"/>
            <author fullname="R. Sabett" initials="R." surname="Sabett"/>
            <author fullname="C. Merrill" initials="C." surname="Merrill"/>
            <author fullname="S. Wu" initials="S." surname="Wu"/>
            <date month="November" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document presents a framework to assist the writers of certificate policies or certification practice statements for participants within public key infrastructures, such as certification authorities, policy authorities, and communities of interest that wish to rely on certificates. In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that potentially (at the writer's discretion) need to be covered in a certificate policy or a certification practice statement. This document supersedes RFC 2527.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3647"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3647"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4949" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4949">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Security Glossary, Version 2</title>
            <author fullname="R. Shirey" initials="R." surname="Shirey"/>
            <date month="August" year="2007"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FYI" value="36"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4949"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4949"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8410" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8410" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8410">
          <front>
            <title>Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for elliptic curve constructs using the curve25519 and curve448 curves. The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519 and Ed448. The key agreement algorithms covered are X25519 and X448. The encoding for public key, private key, and Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) structures is provided.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8410"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8410"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8411" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8411" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8411">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registration for the Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <author fullname="R. Andrews" initials="R." surname="Andrews"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">When the Curdle Security Working Group was chartered, a range of object identifiers was donated by DigiCert, Inc. for the purpose of registering the Edwards Elliptic Curve key agreement and signature algorithms. This donated set of OIDs allowed for shorter values than would be possible using the existing S/MIME or PKIX arcs. This document describes the donated range and the identifiers that were assigned from that range, transfers control of that range to IANA, and establishes IANA allocation policies for any future assignments within that range.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8411"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8411"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.wiggers-hbs-state" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wiggers-hbs-state-02" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="S-HBS">
          <front>
            <title>Hash-based Signatures: State and Backup Management</title>
            <author fullname="Thom Wiggers" initials="T." surname="Wiggers">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">PQShield</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kaveh Bashiri" initials="K." surname="Bashiri">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Stefan Kölbl" initials="S." surname="Kölbl">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Google</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jim Goodman" initials="J." surname="Goodman">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Crypto4A Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Stavros Kousidis" initials="S." surname="Kousidis">
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="1" month="April" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (S-HBS) such as LMS, HSS, XMSS and XMSS^MT combine Merkle trees with One-Time Signatures (OTS) to provide signatures that are resistant against attacks using large- scale quantum computers. Unlike conventional stateless digital signature schemes, S-HBS have a state to keep track of which OTS keys have been used, as double-signing with the same OTS key allows forgeries. This document provides guidance and documents security considerations for the operational and technical aspects of deploying systems that rely on S-HBS. Management of the state of the S-HBS, including any handling of redundant key material, is a sensitive topic, and we discuss some approaches to handle the associated challenges. We also describe the challenges that need to be resolved before certain approaches should be considered.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wiggers-hbs-state-02"/>
          <refcontent>Work in Progress</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SMI-PKIX" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="SMI-PKIX">
          <front>
            <title>SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="hss-x509-v3-certificate-example" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a">
      <name slugifiedName="name-hss-x509-v3-certificate-exa">HSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">This section shows a self-signed X.509 v3 certificate using HSS.</t>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-2">
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            e8:91:d6:06:91:4f:ce:f3
        Signature Algorithm: hss
        Issuer: C = US, ST = VA, L = Herndon, O = Bogus CA
        Validity
            Not Before: May 14 08:58:11 2024 GMT
            Not After : May 14 08:58:11 2034 GMT
        Subject: C = US, ST = VA, L = Herndon, O = Bogus CA
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: hss
                hss public key:
                PQ key material:
                    00:00:00:01:00:00:00:05:00:00:00:04:c0:96:12:
                    8b:ea:38:30:78:eb:f6:fb:43:d7:7f:9f:9e:81:39:
                    e2:7c:b9:34:4e:6e:53:19:f0:ee:68:75:85:83:d3:
                    2b:e9:7b:14:46:9e:4e:c5:e3:5a:18:0b:30:e5:13
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                58:15:AB:F4:CF:03:69:02:60:7A:57:4D:C5:D5:B3:72:
                8A:19:21:68
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                58:15:AB:F4:CF:03:69:02:60:7A:57:4D:C5:D5:B3:72:
                8A:19:21:68
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
    Signature Algorithm: hss
    Signature Value:
        00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:04:9c:37:52:ff:b9:d7:
        df:f5:5b:01:ba:50:c2:50:cc:6f:f3:b1:73:df:0c:2a:ea:b3:
        ed:96:1e:ce:e7:58:05:da:8d:a7:77:21:42:32:d9:f9:4a:4d:
        f7:2b:18:2a:1c:5c:69:03:f3:1c:9c:95:6d:31:9a:c9:ca:84:
        4d:ae:b3:8b:c3:71:ac:3f:87:51:be:38:b4:bf:d9:dc:90:1f:
        1e:54:bd:f9:1a:65:70:d4:46:b6:ad:4d:6d:16:b9:fb:29:f4:
        e3:86:42:4a:3f:a4:8f:01:84:9b:44:0b:23:22:9c:97:6d:d5:
        b9:26:39:11:ab:46:82:bd:10:6c:b4:7a:64:ed:c7:40:b0:33:
        f0:b5:81:1c:b4:41:54:9c:30:d9:d2:93:ba:48:8c:4f:d0:25:
        41:60:7b:90:5e:12:20:b7:30:16:16:1e:b7:ee:d8:4b:ee:ed:
        3c:70:fc:ff:36:18:aa:24:23:87:91:65:a8:95:2d:b6:1c:d1:
        02:7b:70:81:8a:18:17:c0:45:62:fe:47:a1:3e:69:54:31:67:
        58:9a:e1:e3:c9:8d:ee:1e:2a:d1:46:75:e9:e4:90:67:01:57:
        92:54:db:b4:ea:de:8b:e7:eb:fc:27:80:9b:d5:da:e0:8e:b0:
        b3:08:ca:6f:a1:1c:f4:40:65:b0:f6:f8:c9:a7:97:04:c8:7c:
        9e:56:ec:2f:4b:cd:45:8b:d7:e6:a7:50:c7:e6:21:2c:17:31:
        23:11:7a:ae:9a:b5:84:5f:e6:5c:82:99:a8:3a:a9:91:87:9a:
        24:5c:83:01:91:7c:fc:cd:be:2e:92:50:fb:12:11:96:08:0d:
        c9:24:0d:bb:6f:fb:59:05:af:7f:96:bc:a3:f4:58:e2:fa:0a:
        4a:f2:4c:f7:b3:1b:81:dd:4a:41:a0:b1:dd:52:4c:bb:6d:c0:
        a8:d9:bb:29:c8:fc:e3:7e:f8:6a:e5:5e:c4:e4:e8:7c:0b:00:
        87:15:75:a2:06:50:97:c6:1f:14:52:79:04:a8:9c:ec:b1:c7:
        6a:46:33:98:b8:63:f7:a7:2c:d4:62:78:94:1c:5d:9d:4f:a6:
        0a:ae:39:50:85:b2:09:8d:62:c9:4c:11:9f:0c:91:a5:ac:2d:
        11:bd:71:b6:0c:ea:34:98:53:fc:2e:cc:7b:a4:9c:2e:7a:a4:
        8d:e2:e8:8c:01:a9:9c:3e:b5:34:77:33:82:01:d4:ef:72:04:
        d6:5b:e5:f6:2c:1b:ae:86:c4:73:02:44:85:d6:f7:ac:a3:e8:
        f6:a9:b5:5c:6d:46:88:da:55:b8:2b:7a:4c:0c:9a:e7:cd:5d:
        62:8a:ca:c8:96:ce:8d:71:7b:d2:c1:0d:9a:35:55:2b:84:3e:
        0e:a5:fa:d6:a0:76:8e:23:b3:df:c9:3b:4f:68:56:1e:e9:3c:
        79:5b:d3:25:54:11:ad:a6:ac:58:11:49:8f:4d:c4:c1:39:99:
        76:3a:a6:d1:2f:57:ad:bf:7c:9d:57:cc:37:0d:29:84:29:7b:
        cb:46:85:c3:81:c5:33:9a:65:c3:2f:01:48:ca:44:6c:f1:84:
        3d:d0:49:c2:c1:05:db:77:4c:b9:72:3d:6f:ce:69:f2:91:c6:
        15:25:8f:da:38:7e:ef:5b:3e:5f:35:ab:a6:78:16:28:42:c1:
        2c:2f:9e:11:53:2c:bd:c4:24:7b:e9:c4:ce:3d:d6:41:c7:5d:
        92:91:c3:37:cb:72:44:d7:0d:70:85:13:0b:ac:b3:0f:b0:e5:
        e3:2e:48:b9:9c:b8:d7:3e:7c:50:69:03:7a:5f:ae:f8:6c:09:
        61:97:6b:ce:cd:e5:f0:55:fe:05:f8:97:1d:9e:81:65:f5:ff:
        9a:7a:8c:96:d8:f8:cf:d8:dc:55:ce:67:7a:00:6b:fd:bb:3f:
        1b:3d:65:94:c1:5a:b6:a0:8e:be:a4:be:26:90:5f:1f:06:d4:
        ea:3f:a6:97:40:8e:bf:18:5c:92:0f:15:e3:05:4a:14:51:1e:
        23:81:ef:cf:f7:a8:88:75:f8:2d:28:37:26:87:27:63:5c:01:
        53:0e:5e:53:d2:a7:18:eb:2f:c0:82:49:05:b0:4d:33:6f:94:
        10:91:77:f8:90:9e:ca:fe:bb:3d:c4:42:d6:89:84:98:42:f4:
        24:b3:b4:db:5e:2b:66:a9:ff:6c:18:d4:79:f8:72:73:53:9b:
        02:ed:04:73:77:a4:68:cf:4b:be:4b:16:50:62:87:f9:49:99:
        e3:a1:0c:42:92:bc:a9:e3:2d:22:82:35:7f:71:15:88:70:6a:
        01:ab:44:64:ad:e5:52:d4:97:ee:bb:44:7b:6e:08:7f:dd:94:
        fd:c9:1c:6b:59:d1:92:51:29:03:ce:ec:bf:41:a5:14:69:54:
        3a:b4:39:d9:44:5d:f1:b2:f4:5c:6b:9f:c9:5f:bb:fc:c8:c7:
        a3:8b:e1:ec:e2:d0:69:5a:40:1c:9c:9d:8a:3d:77:3b:c1:5d:
        c0:72:61:4b:37:c5:96:8c:6d:8b:f8:56:da:ac:3e:3c:72:09:
        ce:f6:c3:fe:5d:cf:37:d9:68:cd:a7:dd:f7:96:63:da:8c:1d:
        df:b8:32:cf:eb:97:11:83:fe:6b:aa:b9:e2:4b:b2:ea:62:73:
        c3:1c:e9:40:90:56:4f:12:c3:ba:f4:2b:d9:1c:50:cc:e0:51:
        d8:eb:bf:67:28:0c:2d:13:8d:b3:6f:13:6a:1d:a7:54:20:ba:
        82:5b:b8:e5:1f:89:f1:67:26:c1:dc:1b:60:57:ed:a6:2c:f2:
        17:01:7f:a5:e7:5c:64:c9:3c:08:f2:cf:48:ec:88:84:ef:03:
        c2:f5:eb:05:31:7d:fe:7f:3c:71:41:28:17:64:5f:b9:ec:54:
        79:d0:b3:98:fb:84:9c:36:8b:43:0b:d4:c9:ec:09:4a:70:13:
        62:f2:36:c8:b4:75:cc:2a:77:08:a0:9d:ef:19:d6:88:dc:e2:
        b2:4e:40:61:71:cb:c7:c3:de:16:6f:49:7f:5e:d5:17:00:00:
        00:05:79:47:12:9f:ce:eb:1d:a8:fd:0d:b0:18:44:6a:ef:54:
        28:46:e4:19:f6:2d:3e:74:bb:9d:36:0a:ae:67:4a:28:7a:1b:
        80:39:a0:08:2a:28:a0:ec:55:ee:55:aa:a1:cc:94:d4:36:1a:
        b3:57:25:30:ad:2c:5e:63:ba:22:fc:aa:7a:59:64:f6:d8:03:
        20:28:71:f9:dc:09:fa:4c:81:b9:64:1b:ad:ea:cb:db:18:17:
        5d:d8:98:bd:d2:8d:c5:04:7c:5b:92:9a:89:f6:bc:d6:55:c7:
        08:5d:3c:58:8e:18:ac:6f:88:a8:d7:9e:d4:ee:5d:f5:21:4e:
        a5:8b:19:5f:e3:f4:66:f9:25:4d:f9:c6:60:62:31:72:5c:34:
        34:67:1a:a7:6a:7d:54:a3:d8:9b:1f:5b:f8:08:41:79:5b:43
</sourcecode>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-3">
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="xmss-x509-v3-certificate-example" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
      <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-x509-v3-certificate-ex">XMSS X.509 v3 Certificate Example</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-1">This section shows a self-signed X.509 v3 certificate using XMSS.</t>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.b-2">
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            54:7e:64:70:29:9e:03:c5:7a:a5:5c:78:d1:27:87:8c:
            54:35:17:5d
        Signature Algorithm: xmss
        Issuer: C = FR, L = Paris, O = Bogus XMSS CA
        Validity
            Not Before: Jul 10 08:27:24 2024 GMT
            Not After : Jul  8 08:27:24 2034 GMT
        Subject: C = FR, L = Paris, O = Bogus XMSS CA
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: xmss
                xmss public key:
                PQ key material:
                    00:00:00:01:2b:eb:bf:66:14:de:6f:96:5b:4d:2a:
                    50:00:7b:ad:5c:22:b0:13:79:72:02:14:a9:5f:fc:
                    96:e0:9b:78:8e:d6:be:8c:1c:70:3c:d8:dd:78:b2:
                    1a:14:47:be:1f:0d:74:72:3f:36:76:c2:cb:19:ad:
                    29:90:0b:82:de:9b:7f:df
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                62:CE:35:A5:47:77:FF:21:87:2E:BC:2D:27:E7:8E:F4:
                35:6B:CF:D8
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                62:CE:35:A5:47:77:FF:21:87:2E:BC:2D:27:E7:8E:F4:
                35:6B:CF:D8
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
    Signature Algorithm: xmss
    Signature Value:
        00:00:00:00:e5:88:a8:b8:73:ad:4d:92:f8:5c:81:c5:8a:63:
        57:6a:a7:3b:54:aa:b6:06:8a:d9:f1:c2:0b:c8:27:1e:4b:a2:
        cf:e2:da:44:ea:e8:f2:40:a8:b9:54:9c:49:36:12:24:df:74:
        ad:e5:29:ef:4f:da:88:0d:21:5d:3b:64:63:27:d0:84:b5:95:
        7a:30:18:37:cd:34:17:dd:ac:9d:9e:48:db:74:07:79:84:21:
        5a:f0:26:cd:21:64:7b:77:33:48:58:67:9b:2c:b2:85:6d:cc:
        ec:31:4b:2f:51:55:3a:85:e1:ca:04:15:ce:6e:47:39:f5:e9:
        31:45:41:ed:71:c6:4f:96:f5:ae:64:6a:bd:72:d0:8c:17:02:
        99:10:1d:14:34:ca:e5:47:e3:f7:66:96:96:11:d5:97:76:76:
        83:f1:84:a5:b6:00:5e:3e:67:97:7a:32:dc:c8:eb:4c:29:46:
        77:99:d6:da:45:e6:7b:8c:45:6d:b5:29:6b:fd:98:a2:89:8d:
        0c:30:42:f5:0b:7c:97:c5:b1:1d:e2:da:67:a9:48:a4:9e:29:
        f4:60:3f:4d:1d:48:83:82:38:ef:fa:cb:1d:86:11:a1:15:94:
        fb:d5:ee:68:f9:44:b9:3d:54:70:f3:be:17:8d:d7:2e:85:2d:
        5c:d0:a0:c5:99:52:cc:79:e7:1c:18:d9:6e:3d:0f:6c:05:51:
        33:28:35:e2:02:59:5f:1f:ed:78:0a:c6:62:f0:7d:fe:73:96:
        03:4c:b4:42:e3:00:c2:d7:cb:eb:51:10:c4:0c:64:b8:37:fe:
        85:d0:8e:11:6d:a6:16:77:b1:1e:01:d9:1e:f3:10:9c:dd:01:
        bc:38:75:5e:8f:58:9e:5b:6c:7b:0a:41:08:59:35:a9:3a:83:
        19:e0:7d:a1:f5:cf:a3:1c:4e:07:e1:ad:03:95:f2:d3:8b:79:
        33:f8:52:22:53:1b:1e:32:9a:61:3f:c4:7c:9a:e8:d5:b5:28:
        f1:84:65:d5:c1:fc:4d:16:93:88:93:69:ca:fa:94:a0:95:4e:
        23:ae:1e:60:e0:e8:b4:bf:ff:16:95:71:0f:31:74:bb:be:b8:
        5a:eb:24:95:8b:95:28:13:cd:e3:a9:65:f7:f5:6e:9b:a9:a9:
        7a:05:ce:ab:f0:54:62:d9:12:f8:a1:1a:68:df:af:15:8f:8a:
        df:67:27:c9:ed:bd:e1:81:a6:8d:9a:84:f3:91:36:d9:89:74:
        8e:ef:84:dc:5c:03:1a:08:e4:d7:f0:72:fc:6d:8a:01:34:94:
        e5:ff:08:51:1b:80:5f:e7:07:d8:9f:25:e4:1d:c3:f8:e5:d0:
        9c:50:cf:66:71:f9:cc:f7:c0:a7:d0:66:01:b7:17:a0:5f:66:
        97:a4:ff:62:ac:1c:a0:63:0d:30:28:e9:90:d5:59:a4:48:d8:
        07:87:02:4b:3f:68:23:a5:04:dc:b3:d7:45:f6:dc:b0:ec:c6:
        90:a6:1c:a1:f8:7e:84:ba:63:7e:5a:64:14:78:58:f5:75:c0:
        f5:e1:1d:bd:49:57:c0:40:08:07:99:7f:43:2e:e2:25:d8:ed:
        a3:1a:e3:78:f1:78:af:02:49:54:36:59:8e:d3:72:a5:0b:52:
        32:bd:17:a2:cf:e1:47:21:28:3d:ba:b6:24:d9:18:f9:44:73:
        35:ed:29:a4:18:bc:ed:68:cd:4a:9a:34:cb:1a:2f:b3:5f:ba:
        73:9b:18:ee:7a:a8:92:25:65:25:81:04:63:1c:22:2b:b8:ba:
        81:21:bc:f9:9d:a8:78:98:75:bc:ed:4a:c6:b7:6f:c0:91:24:
        eb:1d:f9:5d:e0:e3:78:4e:05:f6:34:0f:7b:41:54:49:20:a2:
        30:66:94:f1:da:c1:6c:3f:5e:10:92:92:a3:0c:7e:e8:8b:26:
        11:1c:d7:68:c9:31:79:b3:a4:d5:63:00:68:c3:e3:86:2d:09:
        92:4b:2d:63:7d:b8:03:a4:4c:60:b4:2c:12:d5:0b:9f:16:28:
        ea:88:2f:bb:1c:19:0b:0f:40:3d:67:e8:0b:fa:c6:e3:39:44:
        b2:bd:8a:3f:21:dd:aa:ec:a3:8c:48:dd:4c:99:43:86:d7:48:
        81:6b:e5:b9:bb:59:9f:1c:0f:3f:11:f7:7c:4b:67:a8:95:c2:
        7c:cb:3b:66:b0:79:a6:55:6f:6d:b0:29:8a:5e:7b:ee:30:68:
        f3:dd:41:29:91:f6:79:71:ae:8d:21:70:78:1d:5d:d2:f7:cf:
        e7:42:38:d1:8c:52:a6:a6:f6:b1:38:b1:2b:23:81:e1:1f:21:
        6d:99:3f:10:eb:b1:a9:73:b8:3e:31:99:cc:dd:2b:df:58:27:
        db:0b:5a:29:99:8f:b1:9f:e9:31:42:d0:26:db:53:b7:7e:30:
        41:95:c3:f0:07:83:bb:b0:63:b5:16:48:f2:a6:60:2f:32:5d:
        22:a1:da:76:4e:37:26:53:0d:95:7b:2d:b9:05:2f:93:2b:d4:
        df:c1:02:5b:f7:a5:a2:4f:11:5c:80:f4:f0:bd:c7:ea:3c:db:
        6f:e2:eb:6c:7f:c3:58:d9:31:77:4b:4d:f7:ce:bb:d6:c8:64:
        a3:01:d5:f9:a4:8d:e8:f0:ee:09:06:2c:0b:3c:ac:0a:57:d8:
        e4:81:79:ea:4a:bd:51:03:88:4c:d0:4c:0b:c4:0c:7e:2d:e7:
        df:1b:67:62:c0:d1:9c:ad:bb:d3:f0:75:dd:83:aa:70:99:2c:
        19:78:3d:26:2b:47:6f:24:c1:60:02:1e:4b:75:04:91:1f:08:
        1c:b3:79:a0:9b:db:fb:5d:3f:c7:e3:09:1f:41:3e:64:bb:ad:
        19:3d:35:e1:a6:f4:69:0b:a2:04:37:42:95:c6:c7:e5:f4:56:
        0e:67:5b:78:34:bb:07:f1:8f:e7:73:5b:87:d7:df:c9:2d:8d:
        8c:42:76:87:15:85:4b:23:03:20:34:e1:1b:f6:0c:1e:84:53:
        d9:1b:4e:d9:31:43:38:3b:88:12:84:d8:2a:38:b1:ce:0f:c7:
        07:d4:63:2d:97:89:1c:b3:44:99:eb:d4:df:32:74:be:0d:63:
        11:22:fd:fa:8e:e2:0b:56:12:56:0c:46:16:ad:44:10:26:98:
        dc:cf:c9:95:67:3e:11:c1:76:fa:b8:12:ea:96:f6:d9:91:ac:
        bf:49:b9:1c:8e:15:05:53:ac:9e:04:d2:5b:b8:87:bf:81:50:
        f7:02:a4:c0:9c:18:0f:45:ac:7a:82:cf:46:15:42:40:09:32:
        89:a5:ea:90:a5:99:68:f9:93:0c:7b:d6:7a:a8:e9:51:e2:90:
        9e:b9:ed:21:db:d9:7e:de:dc:62:6b:44:6b:9f:81:c5:77:39:
        8e:1d:78:30:de:dc:53:80:e0:c3:fa:fa:94:68:28:91:98:86:
        ff:86:04:a9:bd:58:7c:31:37:1f:db:9a:29:f3:c1:48:10:20:
        71:5f:fc:35:13:eb:7b:12:e2:7d:1c:cc:97:fe:8f:5c:a2:dd:
        f6:d2:a3:b2:ea:51:b3:ef:b1:1e:79:0b:00:53:f4:f2:52:75:
        5a:d7:17:c5:31:a0:54:4e:2b:28:2c:4f:6b:7a:27:3a:2c:04:
        da:b3:1d:04:4e:a4:4e:94:5c:a8:91:70:ab:c0:4b:75:9f:b3:
        6a:a9:4e:8a:22:e9:7f:fd:ec:53:e7:6a:6d:32:0b:8b:ab:4c:
        e7:7d:72:ec:04:62:1c:1a:45:1e:33:8e:37:ae:6a:2f:c8:fb:
        f3:69:ed:11:01:f3:f4:57:e9:29:d5:3b:0c:9c:0c:c4:cb:c3:
        38:5c:01:e7:d6:31:c3:d8:ce:24:d7:be:71:9b:c8:96:13:ca:
        5c:5d:e4:92:40:af:86:a0:4b:ff:a7:55:39:70:fd:ac:0a:e1:
        87:c7:01:4b:c3:41:36:c6:c6:33:8f:4f:25:4a:8d:70:92:ac:
        7c:95:cc:49:a9:dc:d6:6a:67:52:a5:5b:7f:2f:bb:91:e3:be:
        d6:28:fc:22:d0:72:66:e8:09:73:a7:23:c6:a6:89:38:0b:e5:
        d0:b3:f1:40:38:9c:4d:17:96:11:17:44:ef:e3:94:51:91:4c:
        5d:fe:d9:ed:c3:76:a0:2d:3b:dc:8d:b9:31:15:f6:75:58:74:
        2f:57:b4:29:21:29:6d:5f:eb:06:71:0a:f4:db:ff:c6:2f:16:
        73:a7:76:6b:d0:5b:a7:21:5c:fd:f0:11:e8:6f:9b:d0:c9:c9:
        fe:35:76:4a:4a:63:9b:ba:48:ac:af:4f:91:67:9c:5c:47:d8:
        e3:2d:03:12:5e:f1:cb:56:34:75:69:95:ad:68:96:6c:e7:4a:
        91:72:fb:9b:ba:e8:92:56:fb:9a:5b:5d:3b:9d:d3:c5:c4:52:
        42:1b:f9:4a:47:42:dd:77:49:da:2b:bd:d7:94:5f:7b:b8:64:
        b9:06:32:7c:ea:d1:36:f6:95:b8:57:41:1b:6e:66:31:2c:ee:
        87:7a:5c:19:2f:d8:95:4a:16:93:48:f3:97:25:3d:24:61:1e:
        d0:63:37:ee:3a:c9:a3:46:c5:94:a0:7e:24:cc:7f:72:8d:14:
        9e:3c:33:ec:cd:9a:dd:b5:08:90:98:19:95:85:38:ff:ff:d2:
        1e:bf:a6:c4:97:13:2b:3d:47:e9:57:59:d3:7d:99:01:6e:53:
        4d:c0:82:97:fb:89:d6:7c:b7:23:0e:7d:6e:23:88:53:06:8f:
        16:ff:40:0a:1b:cd:d5:1e:91:01:3e:77:3a:5f:c1:57:3a:7b:
        c6:d5:51:d7:e2:ec:89:12:6b:9d:03:e4:9d:bb:7d:4e:02:bf:
        67:8d:03:ca:90:56:f0:9a:97:4b:02:2d:4c:31:89:82:76:97:
        fe:2f:d5:0a:3d:ea:0d:38:6c:30:75:5f:ae:91:53:d7:45:64:
        df:ba:0b:22:80:44:85:6d:0e:5c:29:7f:82:9e:54:a3:7a:95:
        be:96:79:66:9d:5b:a2:d6:2e:47:c6:99:7d:2b:32:dc:f2:b6:
        02:91:6d:63:d4:93:45:60:c4:42:71:10:9e:fb:90:2f:e6:75:
        71:ce:78:70:c1:da:ff:e1:47:fe:79:2b:8e:9a:81:bf:dd:02:
        e3:78:39:71:17:b3:23:14:11:9d:29:8e:21:a1:98:b0:ac:03:
        5a:6c:9e:62:64:ef:4f:03:ca:37:a6:ed:e4:78:d5:0d:99:29:
        f5:5c:61:e6:48:cb:97:0e:5e:f9:2c:f6:b6:c7:7c:0c:a4:f7:
        1a:f7:67:b5:5c:03:bf:bf:7a:e2:4d:a2:9b:5d:5d:5f:51:d0:
        d6:52:8f:2a:20:68:08:bb:f0:9c:05:0e:ef:b3:49:0c:2a:1d:
        8f:f9:03:b7:61:09:71:88:7d:e2:8c:e4:b8:ac:98:1b:c3:80:
        55:a1:6b:dd:13:a2:29:4f:93:93:d3:d5:01:31:3f:7b:39:0e:
        3a:57:6c:eb:5c:6a:5f:1b:ad:97:bd:97:23:18:91:05:0e:2b:
        b4:b1:11:ee:f8:58:c7:08:d0:de:a2:3e:ba:54:8d:3d:63:da:
        91:50:3a:24:8d:19:18:23:2e:cf:30:8d:5d:e3:e7:02:93:fa:
        c8:f8:ea:05:e6:eb:06:80:90:4d:15:58:3d:26:98:13:4b:b0:
        ac:dd:90:2e:d0:e1:eb:71:32:83:5d:2a:a9:b9:b5:24:fc:e9:
        ec:18:ca:c9:a1:05:59:3e:fa:af:ed:4e:86:b1:fe:40:47:9b:
        42:77:af:9c:2b:a0:e2:3e:fd:51:ab:02:77:e8:f1:39:45:aa:
        54:b6:14:d4:14:20:fc:36:81:e6:04:98:8a:a0:c0:8a:cf:ae:
        f6:b5:dc:b7:eb:26:86:d3:cf:1c:38:65:54:04:b1:b5:09:48:
        f5:2d:07:ba:f8:eb:49:bd:d9:b1:54:ea:ac:c2:0d:20:10:79:
        c1:cb:e9:dc:2d:ff:55:50:4f:f6:05:02:78:31:33:6f:15:7e:
        24:5a:66:23:70:b3:b2:0c:17:39:ce:15:38:c5:ff:60:16:38:
        60:74:72:c9:70:d8:59:b7:80:7f:da:f6:67:3f:d0:ba:be:1b:
        a1:87:da:92:2d:a3:6c:99:29:57:aa:cb:d1:8d:66:f1:2d:c9:
        56:60:24:56:4b:19:9f:f5:65:84:89:86:7d:4d:8b:f8:5b:60:
        dd:af:2d:66:76:6c:66:d9:c6:f5:39:25:6c:e5:7b:43:97:64:
        5c:c5:20:1e:3d:b5:dc:92:b2:9c:d8:1b:1b:e0:bc:44:7b:9c:
        95:c5:53:48:91:b2:a5:46:16:bf:50:af:a5:44:cc:54:78:3f:
        ed:20:d8:2e:0b:41:3d:f1:04:9d:df:3c:4a:d7:81:04:ff:8c:
        b7:79:f8:51:8d:b7:2e:ac:2c:54:e6:fc:43:76:8e:f9:be:8c:
        b8:5c:ad:c4:13:af:b0:6e:3b:d1:82:57:1e:f5:52:84:ca:cc:
        d2:68:f3:2d:04:ff:27:0a:e6:a2:fa:c0:a9:97:d6:64:45:18:
        5c:6f:9e:c1:64:22:66:db:56:02:c3:a8:57:fc:87:1b:5c:43:
        15:8e:58:fc:f2:00:0b:4f:6a:4b:a0:5c:da:f2:e5:1b:82:4a:
        6b:ef:db:63:d7:7d:93:1d:2f:20:78:37:17:22:82:cd:6b:c1:
        83:61:05:81:99:0c:25:29:d6:5f:22:bc:06:67:7d:67
</sourcecode>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.b-3">
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="xmssmt-x509-v3-certificate-example" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.c">
      <name slugifiedName="name-xmss-mt-x509-v3-certificate">XMSS<sup>MT</sup> X.509 v3 Certificate Example</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.c-1">This section shows a self-signed X.509 v3 certificate using XMSS<sup>MT</sup>.</t>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.c-2">
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            5c:22:ad:8a:06:51:9e:67:02:6a:2d:43:3e:8b:c7:23:
            43:77:80:c8
        Signature Algorithm: xmssmt
        Issuer: C = FR, L = Paris, O = Bogus XMSSMT CA
        Validity
            Not Before: Jul 10 08:28:04 2024 GMT
            Not After : Jul  8 08:28:04 2034 GMT
        Subject: C = FR, L = Paris, O = Bogus XMSSMT CA
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: xmssmt
                xmssmt public key:
                PQ key material:
                    00:00:00:01:4b:a7:89:11:6f:fc:1d:fb:d3:e7:71:
                    73:b8:a2:48:ef:53:b9:9d:1f:c6:8a:7c:be:4f:8a:
                    29:fa:41:fd:bd:da:20:7f:f6:3b:b0:c5:b8:a7:c2:
                    f2:5a:f2:26:14:eb:36:f0:26:2f:87:74:fb:0e:d5:
                    7e:17:a0:d1:4d:b6:cf:51
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                7C:7D:59:B8:95:61:D5:03:6A:1E:3D:F1:24:AB:1D:ED:
                04:CD:DB:5F
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                7C:7D:59:B8:95:61:D5:03:6A:1E:3D:F1:24:AB:1D:ED:
                04:CD:DB:5F
            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                CA:TRUE
            X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
    Signature Algorithm: xmssmt
    Signature Value:
        00:00:00:57:c4:98:89:ff:d9:0a:8e:6e:6f:16:95:8c:ec:35:
        42:21:c2:ca:56:ed:f8:81:f1:b2:4f:2b:6d:73:f4:37:55:fc:
        f4:4e:15:eb:6b:90:de:34:fe:d6:96:70:94:8d:c1:e7:4a:32:
        49:30:3a:40:a4:67:d2:fb:da:f8:d8:a1:7a:48:22:1c:e3:98:
        bc:d0:68:85:29:c9:e5:f7:5c:56:d8:9c:80:be:68:ed:11:eb:
        39:0f:ef:cb:09:b2:28:30:a6:2b:05:bc:de:11:22:be:c4:dc:
        08:9a:3d:b4:49:37:1f:54:5e:5f:2d:93:62:b0:95:c5:5d:23:
        92:f3:55:40:78:19:00:56:9e:a2:f1:0e:4b:ae:75:d6:92:09:
        b1:79:ec:c9:18:67:19:09:86:83:74:5d:0a:06:ab:da:f0:af:
        02:97:4d:d7:73:06:8b:a2:84:c7:09:af:dd:8b:15:39:e4:30:
        9f:c9:00:25:a8:33:4d:de:e8:25:b6:35:0b:51:bf:7a:34:a7:
        e8:84:e8:fa:39:5b:aa:37:6e:95:89:ac:26:4a:4e:ca:be:29:
        08:4b:3c:28:a7:85:6a:ad:5a:d2:93:eb:12:e1:9a:87:1c:40:
        3b:cf:15:6c:43:4e:88:21:54:52:7e:0d:6d:17:29:8d:15:6f:
        ef:42:5a:a9:25:d0:97:80:61:31:22:a4:9f:25:17:51:ad:0b:
        a1:cb:93:b4:f5:a6:b0:22:1b:6d:50:64:2a:48:bd:05:16:88:
        00:e3:7b:56:d0:03:b3:7a:2d:6a:0b:f3:de:a2:8c:6e:81:80:
        2c:8f:e9:d8:78:ed:5b:99:c9:13:d1:b6:eb:78:c3:40:2b:a1:
        7a:84:0a:ba:12:87:5e:1d:38:24:22:8f:c0:a3:65:1c:1c:ce:
        2d:8e:e5:2f:1f:be:93:5c:fe:1c:cd:a8:9d:7e:7e:cf:18:e2:
        9c:c5:54:dc:62:61:74:23:55:64:66:21:96:4c:a7:2e:8a:94:
        a6:35:10:a5:e8:5e:6e:91:ac:a8:cb:ed:51:2b:66:45:03:f5:
        87:ed:4d:8c:4e:6d:54:80:a1:33:8a:84:9d:23:31:90:c6:05:
        11:a7:9d:bd:51:0a:73:47:bc:08:49:11:b3:98:ff:01:14:69:
        d7:c0:a0:0c:55:e4:5e:e2:fa:84:ac:27:b3:85:2c:99:71:52:
        9c:33:f8:9d:8c:d2:13:bc:6e:18:79:15:a7:02:ee:15:eb:27:
        d8:af:24:38:02:9c:ca:30:f3:e2:30:41:2f:62:a2:2c:a5:81:
        1b:71:6d:b1:94:bd:c6:3d:9e:5e:51:45:de:5b:f4:d7:e6:35:
        e7:d8:7c:d5:98:ec:7e:0e:f8:9d:c1:a7:7b:b3:65:b1:a1:4b:
        2d:ec:d9:12:45:6b:1f:0b:1c:6b:3b:0a:66:76:39:f4:cc:9b:
        e1:b7:17:f7:53:fc:c3:a6:18:f7:2e:45:52:b1:18:99:75:d1:
        69:bb:77:c8:1a:84:5f:06:b5:8b:cb:02:b0:b2:0f:bf:17:18:
        65:3d:a7:72:5b:71:9f:92:7e:3a:df:84:cc:65:5c:c4:5b:70:
        fd:cc:38:9e:12:6e:f9:ff:1f:02:fc:ca:f5:68:86:fc:ca:71:
        f1:3d:7b:32:b4:d4:c3:a2:20:16:3f:12:07:71:95:3b:d4:b1:
        1e:fc:8c:1f:34:8c:c8:ab:8c:bb:75:93:c1:1a:d2:85:3e:9a:
        e6:04:86:88:de:27:46:ca:f3:f7:f3:8e:54:18:ea:aa:ae:14:
        02:b1:4a:6a:e0:24:77:40:28:8d:37:27:9c:87:6a:81:09:d2:
        01:4d:20:7f:de:84:a8:80:8c:8e:63:82:be:66:df:87:30:5c:
        b8:71:0a:e9:91:68:71:6e:97:97:f0:27:4e:fa:ae:6a:85:ac:
        80:cd:38:48:49:c1:2b:9d:db:54:c5:f0:bf:fa:06:e8:96:3a:
        c0:95:f0:88:bd:8e:80:78:3d:dc:ad:5d:0a:56:dd:c7:80:9f:
        fc:64:58:4d:6d:27:f6:d7:1a:8c:b2:1c:09:ea:7d:4f:74:99:
        0d:4a:0c:b8:b0:ef:74:dd:6f:6f:dc:e5:83:e1:e3:c2:e8:58:
        17:b8:44:8a:2d:ec:df:54:f6:1f:67:a2:b3:c5:19:fb:b9:c7:
        1b:3c:ea:bd:2c:e1:43:65:d1:5a:17:dc:93:9d:c5:85:0c:55:
        34:13:49:15:92:e2:52:14:d1:81:aa:62:02:1a:ba:c9:b0:53:
        85:8e:7b:d1:4e:34:76:ac:79:d7:b3:48:92:bf:55:7e:2d:5c:
        cd:32:9b:c1:41:a7:a3:cd:b7:94:5c:96:1e:3e:27:4d:eb:f0:
        61:4b:a4:e3:3c:bb:69:85:37:e9:9c:98:f4:68:7a:61:77:8c:
        bd:b9:30:d6:f1:fd:69:78:3f:96:99:7b:69:39:90:b3:7c:b6:
        88:ed:cd:19:da:42:64:e5:32:4c:a2:30:f7:c4:e8:27:93:70:
        ed:fa:5e:ca:8e:7a:d1:13:af:15:b1:59:c9:9b:91:61:0b:06:
        d5:cc:2e:80:bb:49:93:dd:be:53:88:be:af:80:64:7c:5e:be:
        7b:8b:e7:5f:39:af:ab:67:42:6b:06:aa:ef:d6:69:af:a9:00:
        1f:a0:15:10:04:3e:db:93:b2:37:db:eb:85:59:43:a2:8d:8f:
        06:8c:cb:a2:1d:a8:3c:9f:f4:a4:7c:c8:cd:ff:f0:a8:79:0f:
        e7:d8:94:67:ec:17:3f:fa:6e:04:07:4f:bf:86:04:6c:fc:46:
        87:b5:10:85:a4:07:e8:af:a9:ec:5d:28:5c:80:8c:31:cc:c7:
        b3:81:17:0b:4b:7d:1c:9e:74:02:1e:ef:de:0d:1b:c1:c0:04:
        4d:46:fd:dc:0b:a4:c6:33:e6:85:0a:60:39:4d:0b:f9:49:44:
        33:e0:15:99:19:bf:c7:8a:c6:96:04:93:37:6b:5d:e8:be:73:
        d4:80:b8:81:0f:9a:91:44:cf:72:02:d3:c9:f8:e0:7d:d2:9b:
        2b:ff:eb:42:6e:38:7e:dc:cd:a7:90:c5:2c:2b:a0:23:37:b9:
        64:10:a6:27:68:47:c5:f1:e8:8d:41:c1:49:e8:35:48:ce:c8:
        08:4c:ad:f2:ad:5d:e9:62:eb:c9:3c:61:85:18:c6:34:73:fd:
        26:a4:f0:50:83:9b:64:54:aa:55:6c:d8:a2:21:81:ff:9c:27:
        39:1f:c3:a2:0e:e5:53:b1:d7:fa:1f:ef:29:8b:c2:90:98:ea:
        2e:dd:45:bf:c3:6c:a3:93:47:99:03:18:25:e8:a5:ee:2e:77:
        eb:7f:f4:49:49:59:98:c1:fc:ab:1e:ad:20:bd:f8:24:fd:21:
        1b:da:5a:07:55:c8:50:05:31:50:93:b2:f8:6e:db:73:4d:5f:
        34:aa:f3:34:83:90:f0:41:6d:c8:43:56:d1:75:07:f5:16:20:
        b3:99:b2:c7:34:25:c4:0e:74:5a:51:0f:7b:3b:7f:6a:a9:41:
        17:b5:47:62:2d:4f:b9:61:97:60:e9:ae:ca:ad:31:6e:4b:0a:
        47:9c:53:66:a3:4e:c3:96:7c:01:a0:8e:ae:83:45:42:e6:92:
        12:8e:97:6f:e8:a0:b7:7d:a6:74:24:aa:20:b0:fa:9e:98:e8:
        7c:b4:da:30:e9:94:08:96:b7:b9:53:4f:75:5f:0c:4d:82:e3:
        cf:6e:bc:fa:23:4f:fa:33:17:7c:98:b6:1e:47:89:3e:d9:a1:
        aa:42:19:25:ae:9e:3f:53:44:ac:91:96:d8:55:c3:40:1d:fa:
        ad:86:38:62:bd:27:2f:26:34:be:ad:9a:01:44:42:c8:54:a5:
        3a:e9:0a:ff:f8:41:6d:38:1e:e2:3d:08:3a:94:4f:1e:60:d0:
        b1:c2:8e:94:34:f0:30:3e:f0:91:25:ee:98:34:b4:8d:95:4e:
        cf:ed:1d:61:89:c9:59:10:68:f2:bc:2e:5c:bd:c0:0f:1d:9c:
        2f:7c:c0:27:25:14:9b:de:a3:74:64:28:14:2c:a2:b2:90:3a:
        a4:6a:50:e9:8e:ca:78:e5:b6:74:56:e0:92:69:7d:b4:2e:e0:
        e7:66:92:16:92:a0:c3:db:4f:d3:d0:57:4d:4a:28:ee:b7:cc:
        04:ef:17:d9:fc:01:bb:1e:b2:5b:02:3d:1f:5a:85:73:a1:81:
        96:b7:33:5d:79:e5:6b:c9:29:73:34:01:69:ea:57:f0:01:be:
        4e:f3:5c:f3:0a:a7:37:08:ad:18:9c:c7:4c:59:d0:5d:bb:01:
        f1:53:76:cb:cd:d9:84:5e:bc:22:11:76:01:d9:e3:af:17:03:
        01:ef:38:4c:ad:c1:7d:a9:c6:61:2b:ba:9c:81:95:86:af:bb:
        73:90:dc:d9:2f:d1:3f:95:6a:b9:46:0f:fb:84:64:7c:7d:86:
        65:aa:10:71:56:19:5f:60:52:7f:19:fa:d5:5a:e0:90:e4:b9:
        62:55:71:2a:61:f9:37:2f:5e:07:71:43:cf:06:ca:6a:d5:52:
        c8:33:e1:ad:b2:3e:a4:61:01:00:bc:55:5d:0a:f3:e6:4f:35:
        06:c4:a8:3f:4c:8b:9b:c9:41:4b:f4:c1:57:ee:3c:c0:44:68:
        52:5a:2d:b9:a7:f2:41:da:c4:8d:7d:db:40:b6:fc:47:63:5a:
        69:a1:c7:8c:cc:3f:af:51:94:37:95:58:82:79:d2:16:4a:bf:
        12:0b:59:a5:a5:11:71:e6:1c:63:3b:ea:f0:2f:10:e0:97:9a:
        a1:04:53:d0:72:f4:3c:77:3b:78:ee:b5:aa:6b:f5:bb:5c:e9:
        35:4f:69:65:87:29:24:ec:47:7b:78:5a:a7:c1:e5:f1:73:7d:
        4d:79:ef:ef:4e:75:87:db:8f:36:fd:50:3e:74:dc:17:d4:c3:
        3f:4f:82:24:51:1b:12:16:26:61:db:93:15:19:39:55:f5:05:
        2c:6e:85:dd:b2:cc:4f:c0:09:0a:76:46:d8:e4:f2:11:92:a1:
        e0:36:a8:25:c7:45:19:6c:98:eb:9a:fa:c1:ec:80:18:ce:d1:
        f8:c4:23:9a:f9:b8:1f:05:67:8e:45:cb:e6:ee:0b:fa:db:67:
        1f:62:2c:49:78:bb:55:98:1e:33:42:63:f2:db:ee:73:f7:60:
        80:6d:5f:9a:e8:8c:89:39:5b:b2:84:e2:c3:99:77:f3:5f:19:
        ec:b8:2b:ce:60:59:2c:66:06:f9:c1:43:b9:fd:94:35:9e:28:
        9d:a0:8e:fd:0d:c6:1a:bb:20:93:b0:63:6a:83:2f:0a:db:c2:
        b3:8e:b1:dd:f5:ab:19:09:53:7a:db:72:3f:1e:25:07:eb:1a:
        7d:21:da:88:22:e6:f0:ba:b3:15:6f:95:f3:72:d2:cb:6d:48:
        b8:ba:7b:aa:40:7f:81:fe:ba:15:c2:77:9d:86:58:bc:7d:89:
        2e:7b:3a:96:04:9f:f1:3a:50:48:5a:25:4d:91:b6:ed:de:f6:
        2e:4d:e5:77:11:6d:76:f4:23:5f:91:f0:0f:79:59:7a:f3:32:
        24:11:c4:88:30:21:26:3b:f1:79:0f:04:06:ad:82:6d:ea:58:
        4e:aa:4e:0a:7f:7b:5c:a5:ab:de:76:a9:a9:c7:d9:e3:eb:d6:
        84:80:02:ab:da:4c:5b:49:90:29:c5:cb:5b:1c:06:61:e8:9a:
        cf:a4:ea:9d:31:16:6a:21:3a:d9:22:25:b8:39:9d:4c:e3:86:
        76:a8:dd:d8:b4:db:88:f9:5e:61:c3:1d:87:df:a9:31:33:7a:
        b3:50:3e:f2:cd:ad:a0:9d:98:5f:6c:e2:f0:d8:27:b9:c2:37:
        7f:8d:b4:f8:84:13:5f:22:6d:9b:81:bd:1c:e5:75:ae:b5:95:
        d1:cb:d0:c6:e3:78:ec:8c:71:6d:8c:5d:40:79:7d:58:3d:5c:
        63:77:cc:2e:a2:63:a9:71:30:2f:59:2a:ec:82:b1:e5:b9:d6:
        bf:fb:21:e6:97:fc:70:45:9a:c7:e8:d2:81:73:b1:f5:bc:76:
        ca:b4:be:9f:39:b5:2d:f2:3e:c5:32:e3:ae:3c:fd:74:a1:36:
        5a:5c:4d:f6:de:d2:d5:66:61:74:88:2e:4b:69:7c:29:2f:e0:
        2a:d6:d8:93:99:41:bc:7b:7f:fc:c3:1c:84:ed:16:c0:08:78:
        fb:57:61:9e:83:7a:d1:e9:b7:ad:9a:85:1c:c3:ba:a3:e4:18:
        b6:00:f6:35:27:e2:27:1d:10:dc:44:1d:11:05:a2:db:df:0a:
        59:98:9c:f3:ca:3a:b3:26:2d:d1:c4:3c:fc:21:f3:3c:39:62:
        7f:f4:bd:91:74:ef:02:83:da:4a:22:40:60:9f:6a:9f:8b:8f:
        f1:e4:1e:99:d5:17:55:62:1c:60:01:7d:c7:41:db:19:9e:29:
        01:ba:a0:5f:41:f3:61:ed:9d:0c:9c:ef:32:8b:b0:8a:89:b1:
        e4:06:c9:2f:4d:42:2a:01:84:29:ac:f1:41:a0:a1:c9:b4:83:
        d9:87:1a:53:1f:7f:d4:85:12:2e:79:f3:2c:88:06:73:62:ee:
        16:bc:c7:8b:e7:09:96:ba:02:b5:56:ab:6f:c0:cf:76:64:62:
        0e:1e:b5:e4:69:42:4d:ed:56:96:d9:1d:8d:07:40:7a:c5:bd:
        d3:9f:43:07:e4:9d:b6:26:2b:33:6a:79:d9:8a:ec:ee:51:73:
        f1:91:b0:e8:90:42:db:11:55:57:1b:01:10:fc:11:ff:77:b4:
        09:01:6d:f8:8c:cf:72:16:df:09:12:09:bd:49:ef:33:b9:c5:
        8d:35:60:77:80:8f:ee:98:18:be:bb:3a:61:e9:5b:6a:09:b0:
        0a:1e:38:80:e9:71:46:77:a1:19:7a:c3:04:57:a5:77:e6:5a:
        01:77:d2:92:90:f6:99:50:87:3f:30:8a:37:3d:37:1e:6b:1d:
        a4:71:3c:6b:15:07:01:f6:3d:43:96:a3:f7:30:cf:08:2c:32:
        a3:ca:67:6e:59:da:51:2e:96:bc:97:41:4b:7c:5f:97:a3:cf:
        46:20:9e:64:96:08:f7:0c:03:4b:b4:83:09:db:6c:bb:94:23:
        4e:ff:7b:fb:2f:84:66:0a:96:f9:e1:58:ff:0d:3c:84:62:9c:
        6b:60:9f:7e:39:cf:33:f3:03:2f:c7:d0:8b:6f:f3:9a:62:cc:
        33:c4:bd:b4:fc:b8:80:9d:fe:9e:c2:f0:d0:9e:07:71:a8:f9:
        1f:a7:64:4d:63:f9:6b:ce:3e:44:0a:3f:05:58:90:0d:0c:20:
        7d:4e:c7:52:d0:e5:b7:61:d3:6a:52:08:37:91:15:3c:cf:41:
        ec:ef:88:56:dc:14:2a:12:55:cb:05:01:23:89:c0:fe:ca:de:
        40:d2:d0:96:a3:1f:07:4a:58:96:fa:b2:ef:78:96:f0:73:25:
        c8:2e:20:3b:d8:02:cf:e7:ca:b0:29:1a:25:7f:15:96:2d:fd:
        52:bb:29:c3:fc:bf:b1:7c:d8:0f:76:21:05:28:2e:89:d9:82:
        0e:cb:cd:03:1f:c3:71:b4:0f:75:52:e5:b4:93:8c:ac:ed:d5:
        30:5a:b9:33:84:fd:3c:da:dc:e6:84:6d:c2:66:be:93:ad:67:
        7f:db:d0:08:95:64:5a:2c:13:7f:e2:05:b5:dc:d0:bf:4d:6e:
        93:c2:3b:8c:3b:b1:5c:3a:28:e8:c3:96:ed:59:e2:62:52:8e:
        95:8d:b5:e1:c1:f2:34:5b:bf:5a:cc:f1:ee:ec:3d:6c:61:99:
        f2:c8:e4:05:5f:ea:d5:74:3c:ff:df:1b:20:bd:35:30:c0:27:
        f8:a4:6e:73:45:81:e2:b9:15:52:c7:a0:e7:c8:fd:7b:8e:f7:
        d2:0c:c4:e9:22:69:4e:70:62:c7:8a:a2:a6:61:7c:0b:5a:74:
        8d:0f:c0:e5:66:dc:18:7b:74:3b:72:ab:1a:53:b3:49:ef:50:
        aa:76:80:e7:11:53:90:ab:24:d1:2e:fc:66:41:cf:b3:cc:ae:
        ac:f9:eb:1e:19:f7:bc:54:00:16:da:b0:d4:2b:74:c7:35:fb:
        08:ff:67:14:83:5a:eb:6b:b7:b4:63:28:e2:b6:b8:d4:0c:13:
        6a:8c:bb:30:c1:fb:6c:42:df:23:c4:f0:be:25:df:2b:39:11:
        bb:82:c3:e7:f9:04:48:77:cf:d0:5e:3d:6e:19:7f:b3:c4:2f:
        c4:ec:51:5f:9d:c7:8f:88:9f:21:79:8d:a0:17:3e:17:73:b4:
        f5:a2:71:70:e6:99:c4:fd:4c:f2:63:64:23:22:c3:72:71:52:
        43:42:a5:90:e3:59:77:50:ff:a1:09:2e:c7:f6:7e:17:f2:a2:
        d6:7e:2c:75:f2:ab:9e:36:78:ab:57:be:c5:91:71:70:2c:ba:
        03:91:80:97:f4:9e:16:bc:fa:80:f4:22:2a:b5:75:15:57:d9:
        b0:92:9e:b1:35:db:26:96:77:28:9c:89:99:db:9b:55:d4:29:
        15:5f:54:8a:0d:58:a8:95:13:95:17:6c:6b:b0:2a:a3:fa:1a:
        ec:2e:b4:0e:08:ea:8f:e1:8c:59:cf:7d:60:00:f3:bf:b7:e4:
        5f:08:a6:02:ef:ce:d7:9c:8d:6f:56:d7:c9:35:e9:e5:cf:d2:
        f5:28:ca:e6:36:ef:c4:26:52:d5:4d:04:ec:50:73:87:dc:70:
        1f:1a:db:07:bf:4c:e9:ec:57:98:7f:bc:c8:31:9e:7e:e6:3a:
        b4:c4:77:93:39:56:57:67:05:84:8d:03:02:d9:bf:04:6b:fe:
        71:8a:be:b6:8a:ae:44:b0:dd:db:1f:6a:26:e5:50:d5:ff:03:
        81:d8:1b:9f:3f:a6:bc:1b:52:b5:49:93:b0:27:fd:59:d4:7d:
        69:e9:63:35:0b:9b:de:a1:d4:70:0c:08:41:4b:76:d6:cd:c8:
        65:8c:bb:9a:6e:e4:f1:e2:30:13:9d:a3:c7:67:16:0f:7d:bd:
        ac:dc:aa:9c:17:01:a6:27:14:fa:4a:c1:27:3f:07:7b:9f:2f:
        47:56:cc:f0:96:38:e9:58:7c:1f:6c:73:10:3c:11:68:2a:3c:
        5f:74:fe:37:ae:8b:e9:eb:c6:06:30:6f:62:3c:5c:6c:2d:c7:
        5b:24:6d:cc:75:3f:d7:d4:e6:72:64:8a:ad:03:67:ad:cd:cb:
        2d:7c:82:49:a9:ef:e8:b9:be:f2:6c:98:42:4e:26:46:04:58:
        a5:2b:c9:88:9b:a4:91:7f:22:09:12:52:2a:d1:4e:36:22:d8:
        53:bc:38:93:ad:11:19:c5:e7:c9:83:00:b4:b6:b0:ac:96:32:
        ca:d0:08:69:e4:d2:29:86:74:74:49:be:4a:b2:bf:f2:2f:c2:
        52:fd:15:3c:8d:07:12:3a:98:c7:49:67:81:1d:b1:5d:e8:f4:
        42:79:a0:f7:44:b8:95:9f:e1:37:41:5b:c9:b1:89:90:7b:66:
        96:eb:8e:dc:1b:d7:73:b2:eb:c1:42:41:e8:2d:28:ba:74:ea:
        7c:77:87:76:5b:36:10:3d:87:08:52:94:e6:60:95:c1:1b:c9:
        27:c1:42:aa:32:62:ed:ca:6f:04:4e:11:3a:3d:3d:e0:d8:3a:
        c0:ff:b9:9a:94:b1:79:f3:01:14:3a:99:34:59:8e:d9:ac:f1:
        a9:77:b5:2d:59:e1:29:96:1b:13:80:8b:10:94:3e:c2:51:db:
        c1:24:06:02:47:96:9b:ae:5d:25:34:af:4b:65:f3:8a:eb:65:
        7c:a5:5e:7c:a2:d6:1d:41:20:13:0b:5e:ea:67:b2:eb:bf:6c:
        44:fb:76:31:58:5e:d2:33:6d:6f:9c:3a:41:70:34:11:6f:99:
        8c:42:9d:d6:2b:14:79:b0:ac:d4:de:3a:b0:d8:d2:97:88:9a:
        17:68:3e:79:a8:b0:4a:d7:a7:3c:63:c5:29:c1:65:76:74:7e:
        c2:de:b8:49:ce:26:5f:d2:62:2d:0f:5c:cc:6c:53:c0:a4:75:
        05:52:d1:52:38:ae:72:17:7c:02:67:6b:76:38:e7:72:aa:38:
        70:5e:af:a2:98:c0:c1:7a:a0:6d:ec:90:51:8d:d5:99:8b:39:
        05:6a:eb:0c:87:37:5b:4b:00:91:2c:7d:8a:6d:c1:23:10:44:
        26:5a:47:f7:7f:8f:86:1c:c2:a7:9f:9e:48:f6:42:cd:d1:3c:
        d9:e8:95:de:00:3c:ec:db:a1:a3:c0:7f:f7:17:3b:4a:dc:d2:
        f5:d4:9b:12:19:0f:6d:13:38:72:06:21:eb:94:88:87:8f:a1:
        de:f6:d7:a0:88:aa:e3:47:bb:69:e8:30:59:82:d2:3a:6d:c7:
        26:95:92:a4:58:07:eb:db:a5:d1:bb:51:00:28:ef:6f:c8:ce:
        9c:0f:d9:8d:e0:b3:14:db:90:dd:f9:26:af:b0:88:48:ae:22:
        71:26:af:d5:e0:4d:5c:41:e6:0b:f2:5c:9b:bb:69:82:09:5a:
        58:63:b9:0c:8a:22:37:aa:a2:71:2a:a5:d9:a7:7b:9f:d5:f4:
        17:8d:bd:4e:de:08:6a:a4:20:ce:a6:85:c7:fa:05:c7:d8:03:
        77:0c:dd:40:32:11:43:2a:8c:50:22:4b:fa:a1:d1:f1:94:42:
        3f:d5:b8:a0:dd:01:71:6e:30:34:ff:a6:76:80:e6:c1:04:8b:
        f0:c3:38:14:98:ae:eb:fd:05:98:d1:96:7e:b4:bf:51:ce:aa:
        b4:66:71:30:9f:7a:45:b6:ed:d1:6e:8f:b0:6c:a5:f5:4f:ee:
        bc:ea:65:5e:24:43:73:4b:50:8e:c8:68:0f:23:48:ed:dd:ff:
        84:97:9b:31:0d:bb:2c:db:69:6b:0c:34:73:3e:ae:69:d2:f5:
        be:a8:99:be:7b:40:82:f4:fe:35:f5:3d:a3:b1:b4:e2:6c:79:
        b7:0b:29:ad:30:3d:56:9d:bc:24:e9:e6:a5:6d:cc:83:18:7b:
        d5:98:a3:5f:dd:71:72:29:71:45:8f:41:52:ce:86:99:5c:f1:
        40:0c:1e:b1:97:da:3a:14:4a:a7:02:48:d8:4e:63:12:99:da:
        28:e9:de:0d:17:90:3a:f5:da:9a:01:7c:15:12:bf:00:48:7d:
        63:8c:89:0b:b9:77:95:01:27:b2:33:73:4b:ab:a8:f3:24:ee:
        c1:d3:0c:a3:9e:26:fe:24:23:3b:82:b4:1a:5e:72:dc:9e:91:
        3a:7b:85:64:0d:30:2e:6b:55:53:7e:a2:4f:b7:10:e4:77:a1:
        01:4a:b2:d7:7f:1c:94:a6:a7:e5:66:e2:c7:e5:37:6d:89:2c:
        72:b1:53:cf:d6:67:0f:77:f8:bf:07:20:98:99:60:ef:2e:72:
        c0:72:9e:79:2a:ca:a2:f7:bc:82:db:53:f7:68:e3:ed:4f:38:
        64:83:1b:dd:a5:78:dc:db:08:a9:34:35:f6:f1:9c:76:85:5e:
        cd:59:a3:c8:89:50:5b:bd:a0:64:06:b4:d7:db:7a:e1:75:57:
        13:90:ce:05:4b:a0:f6:22:70:0b:78:a0:84:46:87:b4:a7:0d:
        88:c6:41:c5:93:cb:77:37:d1:af:37:48:b9:47:db:99:7a:98:
        36:82:cb:27:6a:9a:de:80:24:3a:29:eb:ab:bd:b0:40:0d:a6:
        50:e5:a4:72:a3:19:cb:f3:52:8e:2f:1d:10:ef:7d:0a:15:6c:
        49:08:53:55:84:85:5c:73:53:ce:3e:18:e5:04:92:a6:99:db:
        4d:7b:c7:a9:99:ce:aa:90:48:73:7a:61:f5:92:73:da:b4:26:
        74:a1:39:74:e3:82:f9:32:e0:08:ef:bc:2f:9f:6d:e1:da:3d:
        f0:a5:46:b6:17:95:b8:6b:13:7d:f3:a1:31:8d:b7:47:a0:45:
        aa:20:53:d6:f0:3c:eb:a2:e7:7a:26:8c:c6:c7:cb:0f:21:5a:
        df:46:06:c5:b2:2d:a5:3b:b7:01:fd:0f:55:1b:5e:58:00:70:
        94:a3:7f:48:8e:4a:67:a4:14:5d:e0:ba:b6:f9:9b:e7:de:61:
        d8:67:83:ac:b7:01:eb:62:c5:22:b8:48:3a:96:55:fb:1a:4a:
        c4:63:30:f3:78:05:a6:ab:0c:e7:33:a0:88:f7:e2:e3:4a:1b:
        fd:66:3c:14:be:ee:20:d1:32:95:db:97:ff:d9:c2:bc:7a:c8:
        e4:ba:24:c5:b2:2e:16:f8:53:af:b4:57:56:25:26:f5:36:48:
        eb:0c:20:f9:3b:73:ff:dd:bd:20:81:0c:f5:55:89:7d:46:1b:
        05:b6:25:df:96:99:ea:09:79:60:72:d8:37:92:a8:f1:75:a3:
        5c:6d:54:b7:f3:32:17:35:1a:2d:96:e5:5e:fc:cd:54:30:49:
        af:6f:1a:42:d9:98:52:72:73:74:72:b7:72:95:80:1d:31:5a:
        e4:83:b7:b6:d4:14:00:0b:59:ce:7c:bc:1d:72:24:ab:74:d6:
        2c:9c:20:b1:0a:78:6f:a9:76:8d:6c:37:02:35:bd:6f:99:ee:
        d1:45:36:f1:34:60:7a:12:57:27:68:05:26:14:75:3c:9f:0d:
        3e:b7:5d:b8:2a:6c:1d:a7:b0:41:c4:f4:3d:ae:8e:51:54:37:
        65:ad:0a:c9:28:a0:3f:04:ed:54:59:c4:9f:1d:3d:70:97:5f:
        f9:44:53:ff:15:9f:03:13:7b:41:6b:c0:f7:8f:a3:27:2b:03:
        39:37:8f:bd:91:65:4d:74:a9:9f:45:6a:a4:25:dc:4c:f9:7e:
        59:fc:4e:93:7c:89:8f:71:8e:a6:99:66:5e:6a:25:a4:c0:a6:
        fa:25:f7:68:5c:8a:02:f5:7b:49:cd:89:e1:77:78:95:1b:a9:
        21:78:6e:f4:7a:e2:04:e5:0e:21:52:bf:04:cd:0c:69:5d:d7:
        f2:57:71:9f:d8:01:e0:f3:10:cc:15:2d:fd:99:78:ff:dc:1f:
        8f:a9:31:0d:0f:9f:f4:2c:a1:3d:4f:b2:51:92:68:f0:ec:d8:
        5f:c4:55:a1:4c:c8:12:e9:05:7e:05:93:5f:f9:76:99:85:18:
        29:24:60:14:5d:b3:79:f9:4b:7c:e4:22:71:8a:c2:66:45:d2:
        41:14:5d:59:4c:0a:b5:2b:ab:bd:c6:50:f8:87:37:42:e6:d4:
        96:72:cf:45:f0:d4:bf:0d:c5:17:9f:f1:b9:12:5c:a8:74:89:
        9e:56:07:cf:8f:98:9a:da:d7:db:7f:c7:d0:3a:0a:14:cd:5a:
        66:0c:eb:02:76:a0:d4:56:e6:e8:be:a1:f0:c7:23:b3:4f:86:
        90:1a:5a:16:8e:07:0d:24:d1:ee:03:98:9f
</sourcecode>
      <sourcecode type="x509" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.c-3">
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.d">
      <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgments">Acknowledgments</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.d-1">Thanks to <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Panos Kampanakis"/>, <contact fullname="Michael StJohns"/>, and
      <contact fullname="Corey Bonnell"/> for their helpful suggestions and
      reviews.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.d-2">This document uses a lot of text from similar documents, including:
      <xref target="SP800208" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="SP800208"/>, <xref target="RFC3279" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3279"/> and <xref target="RFC8410" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8410"/>, as well as <xref target="RFC9708" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9708"/>.  Thanks goes to
      the authors of those documents.  "Copying always makes things easier and
      less error prone" <xref target="RFC8411" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8411"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.e">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</name>
      <author initials="D." surname="Van Geest" fullname="Daniel Van Geest">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">CryptoNext Security</organization>
        <address>
          <email>daniel.vangeest@cryptonext-security.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author initials="K." surname="Bashiri" fullname="Kaveh Bashiri">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
        <address>
          <email>kaveh.bashiri.ietf@gmail.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Fluhrer" fullname="Scott Fluhrer">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Cisco Systems</organization>
        <address>
          <email>sfluhrer@cisco.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Gazdag" fullname="Stefan-Lukas Gazdag">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">genua GmbH</organization>
        <address>
          <email>ietf@gazdag.de</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Kousidis" fullname="Stavros Kousidis">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">BSI</organization>
        <address>
          <email>kousidis.ietf@gmail.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
